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Abstract: A major focus in judicial politics research has been to measure the extent to 
which the U.S Supreme Court behavior is constrained by the other branches of 
government, while leaving the Court’s capacity to alter the behavior of political actors 
relatively untouched. This project seeks to reset the judicial politics agenda by evaluating 
the impact highly salient U.S. Supreme Court decisions have on the public’s assessment 
of presidential performance and the viability of presidential candidates. Using a mixed 
methods approach, I quantitatively and qualitatively test the Supreme Court’s influence 
on fluctuations in presidential approval ratings, presidential election public opinion polls, 
and day to day campaign donations to determine if the American population uses the 
information cues provided by the Court to alter the perception of their support for the 
presidency. I argue that the salient Supreme Court decisions will indeed have an effect on 
the population’s evaluation of the presidency and will be exhibited through either the 
Affirmation Effect or the Counter-Mobilization Effect.  The Affirmation Effect evaluates 
the Court’s impact on the public when their ideological disposition aligns with the Court 
and encourages the citizenry to increase their support for the presidential candidate who 
matches the same beliefs. The Counter-Mobilization Effect evaluates the Court’s impact 
on the public when their ideological disposition fails to align with the Court and thus out 
of fear that their ideology is under attack, they heavily mobilize their support for the 
president or presidential candidate who also ideologically disagrees. I find significant 
support for the Counter-Mobilization hypothesis suggesting that high salient U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions lead those who ideologically disagree with Court decisions to 
heavily mobilize their support behind the “losing president/candidate” by donating 
directly to the campaigns. These findings suggest the Court has an indirect impact on the 
presidential campaign process when it renders politically relevant decisions, and should 
encourage further research into the nature of the Court’s influence on other branches of 
government.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
June 28
th
 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court is left with the difficult task of ruling on 
the Affordable Health Care Act. Seeing that the passing of the Affordable Health Care 
Act was one of the primary achievements in the Obama administration’s first term as 
president, the subsequent Supreme Court ruling could have a significant impact on the 
upcoming 2012 presidential election. While there are countless scenarios that could arise 
from the outcome of this case, a subset of these outcomes could include: (1) The U.S. 
Supreme Court affirms the Affordable Health Care Act and legitimizes the incumbent 
president’s campaign, (2) The U.S. Supreme Court negates the new health care law and it 
leads to the affirmation of the challenger Mitt Romney’s policies or (3) It is equally 
possible that counter-mobilization occurs where public opinion associated with the losing 
side of the Affordable Health Care Act decision creates a rally around the flag effect for 
those who feel their ideological disposition is being attacked by the Courts. In the end, 
this rallying effect could lead to a rise in support for the candidate that ideologically 
associates with the losing side. Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court rules 5-4 in favor of 
the Affordable Health Care Act, thus legitimizing the President’s previous policies and 
perhaps facilitating his electoral victory. While the policy implications of the decision are 
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clear, we know little about the indirect influences created by the Supreme Court that stem 
from a highly salient decision such as this. The following pages attempts to answer a very 
simple research question: Do high profile Supreme Court Cases similar to that of the 
Affordable Health Care Act have a significant impact on the way voters assess 
presidential candidates and incumbent presidents? 
 The goal is to determine if there is an actual relationship between salient cases 
decided by the Supreme Court similar to the Affordable Health Care Act case and the 
evaluation of presidential performance or the validity of a presidential candidate. Is it 
possible for the U.S. Supreme Court to have a significant impact on the way American 
voters view presidential candidates and thus sway them to vote in a particular way? 
Granted, almost all Supreme Court rulings can be divided along partisan lines with at 
least one major political party agreeing and the other disagreeing with the decision. Thus, 
if a decision laid out by the Court affirms or rejects a voter’s ideology or the policy 
platform of the president, it should elicit a reaction. The overall objective of this thesis is 
to determine if the populace responds to salient Supreme Court cases and provide enough 
evidence that the U.S. Supreme Court is capable of having a significant impact on the 
other branches of government. To achieve this goal, I will utilize both quasi-experimental 
methods and interrupted time-series analyses to conduct pre and post-tests before and 
after a high salient case occur. This study is set out to reset the agenda in judicial politics 
to generate a larger focus on the manners in which the U.S. Supreme Court impacts the 
other branches of government. 
 On the surface, this questions seems particularly simplistic and one that should be 
readily accessible within the literature of the political science field. Certainly there has 
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been research regarding the impact the U.S. Supreme Court has on presidential elections. 
Unfortunately for the political science literature, and luckily for my research agenda that 
is not the case. After a broad search through the political science literature, I have found 
very little focus on the ways in which the U.S. Supreme Court can alter the behavior or 
impact the presidential office. While obviously, there are clear-cut institutional examples 
like judicial review that are capable of having direct consequences on the policy making 
process, there has been little focus within the field on the indirect manners in which 
Supreme Court decisions can impact the presidency. Rather than evaluating how the U.S. 
Supreme Court impacts the other American branches the judicial politics field has largely 
focused on how the court’s behavior is altered by various external actors. Whether it is 
congressional pressures on the court (Segal et al 2011), presidential pressure on the court 
through the Solicitor General  (McGuire 1998, Pacelle 2006, Nicholson and Collins 2008, 
etc.) or public opinions impact (Mondak 1992, Gibson, Calderia, and Baird 1998, and 
McGuire and Stimson 2004) there is an attention deficit in regard to the indirect ways in 
which the U.S. Supreme Court can influence the elected branches of government that 
makes this particular research project interesting and necessary. The following pages will 
be asking questions and seeking answers to issues that have yet to be appropriately 
analyzed in the political science field. This study is capable of striking new ground for 
the field of political science as well as new avenues of influence for the judicial branch. 
Ultimately, I will find that the lack of focus is understandable given the extremely 
difficult data-limitations that I will discuss in latter parts of the paper; this is certainly a 
political phenomenon that is difficult to capture. While this paper solely focuses on the 
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relationship between the U.S. Supreme Court and the Presidency, there is certainly room 
for research in the other avenues as well.  
  The stated goal of this research project is to generate an improved understanding 
of the impact salient Supreme Court cases have on the public’s evaluation of presidential 
candidates. However, what is a salient case and why is it important? For the sake of this 
research project a salient case will be defined as a U.S. Supreme Court decision that has 
received a large amount of attention from the public. To properly assess the impact 
Supreme Court cases can have on the public’s evaluation of the presidency, it is 
important to only look at cases that will actually have an impact on the public. It would 
be relatively pointless to measure if a random U.S. Supreme Court case has an impact on 
the general populace given there is little chance the population would be aware of the 
issues before the court or care about its constitutional implications. Thus to deal with this 
issue, I will limit the cases studied to only those that fit within the New York Times Case 
Salience measurement (Epstein and Segal 2000). This particular measurement finds a 
Supreme Court case to be salient when it appears on the front page of the New York 
Times. Epstein and Segal (2000) argue that this is the most appropriate approach to 
dealing with salience issues because the New York Times is aimed at general national 
readership that avoids a regional bias. The New York Times case salience measurement 
is particularly useful for this paper’s purposes because its measures salience on the basis 
of viewership. An issue is salient when a lot of people are aware of the issue and thus 
people have an opinion on the topic. This is extremely important to consider given that I 
am testing the Court’s impact on how the public evaluates a presidential candidate or 
presidential performance. 
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 The other side of the research question deals with measuring the public’s reaction 
to the Supreme Court decision in question. I want to determine if a Supreme Court case is 
capable of having an impact on how the populace votes, feels, or decides to donate their 
money. Basically, I need to measure how the Supreme Court decision impacts a voter’s 
mobilization. There are several manners in which to assess public mobilization for or 
against a president in office or those on the campaign trail. With this in mind, the 
remaining chapters of this research project will assess the overlapping research question 
using three different levels of analysis to measure how salient Supreme Court cases can 
alter the public’s assessment of the president:  
(1) Presidential approval ratings will also be used to assess voter 
mobilization in reaction to Supreme Court decisions. Due to data limitations, I 
will be using data ranging from 1993-2012. Looking at presidential approval 
ratings will allow us to maximize the limited number of salient cases by extending 
the measuring periods beyond the election periods. This measurement will be 
used to assess how Supreme Court cases alter the manner in which the populace 
evaluates the current president.  
(2) Public opinion polls throughout the election cycle serve as the second 
level of analysis for this research project. Due to data limitations, I will be using 
data from the 2004, 2008, and 2012 presidential election cycle. The goal is to see 
if a high profile decision laid out by the Court provides a greater advantage to the 
presidential candidate that supports the decisions or the candidate who disagrees 
with it. Basically, the question is whether a citizen’s reaction to the Court’s 
decision leads to influxes in public opinion for the presidential candidate who also 
6 
 
ideologically aligns with the Court and if a negative reaction leads to influxes in 
public support for the candidate on the “losing” end of the Court’s decision.  
Overall, the emphasis of this model will be to determine if there is a reaction from 
the public in response to the court and if so, determine the direction.  
 (3) The final research strategy used to test salient cases impact on 
presidential evaluation will be campaign donation data. Due to data limitations, 
this model is restricted to the 2008 and 2012 election cycle. Given the small 
number of salient cases during this time period, a more qualitative approach 
focusing on an interrupted time series analysis will be utilized. While the small 
number of cases limits the generalizability of the findings, being able to look at 
how the populace decides to spend their money on a campaign provides an 
extremely useful and tangible analysis of the impact the Court can have on 
presidential elections. Is there a spike in campaign donations after a high profile 
Supreme Court case? If so what are the most likely cases to provide the 
candidates a boast and why. Given the direct nature of campaign donations as 
compared to participating in a public opinion polls, it is highly likely that the 
campaign finance data used in this study will provide us with the most useful 
results.  
The general hypothesis advanced is that high salient U.S. Supreme Court cases 
will have an impact on the American populace’s assessment of presidential candidates 
and current presidents in office. I argue that the Court’s general influence can be 
manifested through two equally possible and non-competing scenarios. A U.S. Supreme 
Court decision, depending on its ideological direction and the ideological disposition of 
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the voter will create either a positive or negative reaction to the decision and the 
candidates the decision aligns with. Below is a description of these two potential 
outcomes:  
(1) Affirmation hypothesis: in this scenario, the U.S. Supreme 
Court case affirms a set of ideological beliefs and thus 
motivates the populace to engage in support of their desired 
candidate. As a result, there should be a spike in public opinion 
ratings/campaign fundraising or presidential approval for the 
candidate that more closely aligns with the direction of the 
decisions.  
(2) Counter-Mobilization Hypothesis: in this scenario, high profile 
Supreme Court cases have an adverse effect creating a more 
negative response motivating the opposite party to increase 
their support of the candidate who does not align with the 
direction of the decisions. This can be associated with a rally 
around the flag effect, where when individuals’ are threatened 
it can lead to a highly motivated reaction that mobilizes behind 
the presidential candidate that is most likely to protect their 
particular political views. 
The subsequent chapters will provide a more in-depth analysis of the general 
arguments displayed in the introduction section of this thesis. Specifics concerning the 
current state of the political science literature, justifications for theoretical assumptions, 
research methodology, testing results, and conclusions will follow. 
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Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive evaluation of the literature within the 
political science field. Due to the complicated nature of the thesis topic in question, I am 
obligated to discuss many different facets of the fields literature including; (1) how the 
U.S. Supreme Court impacts presidential behavior, (2) how the presidency alters the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s behavior, (3) U.S. Supreme Court and public opinion literature, (4) 
American political knowledge, and (5) U.S. Supreme Court and case salience literature. 
Within this chapter I will also discuss the various holes within the judicial politics 
literature. As discussed earlier, there is a substantial gap in regard to the influence the 
U.S. Supreme Court has on other governmental actors. 
Chapter 3 discusses the theoretical justifications that constitute the argument 
concerning the influence of salient U.S. Supreme Court cases have on the presidency, 
along with the overlapping hypotheses that shape the remainder of the paper. Chapter 3 
presents the general theory utilizing conclusions from the political science literature, and 
shapes the general expectation that the Courts do indeed impact the presidential 
evaluation process and that their decisions can alter the outlook of the campaign season.   
Chapter 4, 5, and 6 present the data, testing methods and results that are 
associated with Models 1, 2, and 3. Chapter 4 will discuss Model 1, which tests the 
influence highly salient U.S. Supreme Court cases have on presidential approval ratings. 
Chapter 5 analyzes Model 2 which concentrates on a similar relationship but focuses on 
the court’s impact during presidential election cycles using public opinion data. Lastly in 
Chapter 6, describing the data, testing methods and results for Model 3, analyzes the 
relationship between high profile cases and the rate of change in campaign donations to 
presidential campaigns.  
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Chapter 7 summarizes the findings from chapters 4, 5, and 6 and ultimately 
describes the general conclusions that come from this study along with its implications on 
the political science and judicial politics field. In the end, I find support for the notion 
that the U.S. Supreme Court has a counter-mobilizing influence over the presidential 
evaluation process during the election cycle. Model 3 using day to day campaign 
donation data provides support for this notion and clearly depicts the influence of the 
U.S. Supreme Court by finding strong support for the counter-mobilization effect in 
Supreme Court cases during the 2008 and 2012 presidential cycle. It would appear that 
when the U.S. Supreme Court makes a highly salient decision, the side that ideologically 
disagrees with the Court’s decision is more likely to increase their support for the 
candidate who also disagrees with the decision. While there was also some support for 
the Affirmation effect, there was not enough to claim that it has a consistent role in the 
court’s influence leading me to suggest more research in this area Overall; I find little 
support for the Affirmation hypothesis, but strong support for the Counter-Mobilization 
hypothesis. This suggests that American voters are likely to become politically mobilized 
when the U.S. Supreme Court submits a decision that fails to ideologically align with the 
citizenry.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Do salient U.S. Supreme Court cases have a significant impact on the way voters 
assess presidential candidates? If so, is this effect one of affirmation which leads the 
winning party to increase its support for the president who ideologically aligns out of 
confirmation of their ideological beliefs through the credible U.S. Supreme Court, a 
negative/adverse effect which motivates the losing party in effort to protect their 
ideological beliefs, increase its political support for the candidate who aligns with the 
losing side or both? These are the primary questions of contention within this particular 
research project. However, prior to accessing these questions directly, it is important to 
have a clear understanding of the political science literature that will shape the theories 
and research design in the later chapters.  
The following will first focus on the literature concerning the relationship 
between the U.S. Supreme Court and the presidency. I will contend that the political 
science field has limited its focus to only one side of this relationship: how the presidency 
impacts the behavior of the U.S. Supreme Court. I argue that the adverse side of the 
Supreme Court-Presidential relationship needs to be examined much further. First, I 
depict the literature’s limited focus on the Court’s ability to impact the presidency.
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Second, transitioning to the other side of the relationship to discuss topics concerning the 
impact the Presidency has on the Court’s behavior along with its implications on the 
study in question. Third, focus will shift to look at the literature’s assessment of the 
relationship between the U.S. Supreme Court and public opinion.  This study will find 
that this side of the political science literature does not suffer from the one-sided deficit 
described above and shows that both sides of the relationship can be evaluated. Fourth, 
once it has been fully determined that there is a gap in the judicial politics literature 
calling for this research project, I will shift my focus to discuss political knowledge in the 
U.S. and how it impacts the average citizen’s capacity to evaluate the presidency through 
Supreme Court behavior. Lastly, the focus will swing to discuss differing measures of 
case salience and its relevance to the study concerning the U.S. Supreme Court and the 
presidency.  
U.S. Supreme Court’s Impact on the Presidency Literature: 
 This study seeks to evaluate how the U.S. Supreme Court can impact voter 
evaluation of presidential candidates or president’s in office, however this has not been a 
focal point for the field. The literature in regard to the manners in which the Court alters 
the behavior of the executive branch is limited at best. While this makes it difficult to 
formulate informed political theory, it means that this is an area of research that is in need 
of attention and I argue that my research design will help fill in this particular gap.  
While there is certainly a gap in the literature which makes it difficult to 
formulate a literature review around this specific topic, there are few studies in the 
literature that focus on the potential ways the U.S. Supreme Court can alter presidential 
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behavior or alter the public’s evaluation of the president. Ross (2002) chronologically 
tracks the prominence of judicial issues in past elections from 1924 to 2000. Similar to 
Lasser (1988) Ross (2002) finds that judicial issues rarely play a prominent role in 
presidential campaigns and elections and argue that voters show little awareness of 
judicial issues or the knowledge capacity to respond to these stimuli. Ryden (2002) 
counters the claims of Lasser (1988) and Ross (2002) by arguing that since Baker v. Carr 
(1962) and clearly shown in Bush v. Gore (2001), the U.S. Supreme Court has not shied 
away from dealing with important political questions, and has seen its presence grow in 
the electoral realm. 
I would argue that there is an inherent flaw with Lasser (1988) and Ross (2002) 
that leads them to their conclusions. In both of these studies, they focus on all judicial 
issues that occur during the campaign and fail to control for cases of low salience. The 
research design utilized in this particular study will evaluate the relevance of judicial 
issue that is readily salient to everyday voters through the New York Times Salience 
measure. Ross (2002) concedes in his own article that growing public awareness of 
judicial issues will ensure the court’s growing role. Thus, by only looking at cases that 
people are likely to be aware of and understand, I contend that judicial issues will have a 
larger impact on the voter’s calculus than found in Lasser (1988) and Ross (2002). 
Given some of the methodological issues associated with Ross (2002), there are 
still several aspects and conclusions within the study that are useful for the sake of this 
particular research project, especially when it comes to the Court’s relationship with the 
polarization literature. Ross (2002) argues that the increasing polarization of political 
parties would make it easier for voters to discern the two competing sides in a Supreme 
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Court case and that with the cases clearer to interpret for the public and the parties clearly 
aligning with the issue at hand, it is much easier for the case to alter the voter’s decision 
or evaluation of the presidential candidate. The polarization of political parties in the 
recent years should provide the U.S. Supreme Court higher levels of influence on this 
phenomenon which could also lead to different results than from previous years. Another 
reason why rise of party polarization is an important factor to consider is that it can lead 
to voters projecting ideologically conservative or liberal positions not taken up by the 
presidential candidate in question to the U.S. Supreme Court case. I bring this up because 
not all salient cases will be politically relevant or will have any direct link to the 
presidential candidates in question. However, even when there is little link between the 
case and the candidates, it is still possible for voters to project what they expect and how 
the candidate would behave on the basis of partisanship. Therefore, the escalation of 
polarization potentially provides the court with influence it did not previously hold. This 
notion of party polarization in the political realm today is strongly supported in the 
literature by Abramowitz (2011), Niemi, Weisberg, and Kimball (2011), Hetherington 
(2011), etc. These pieces of literature all contend that U.S. political party system has 
become increasingly polarized with the parties moving toward the more extreme ends on 
the political spectrum.  
Ross (2002)’s conclusion that the U.S. Supreme Court does not play a role in the 
campaign process ignores the idea that the lack of tangible evidence showing voter 
response to Supreme Court cases could also be explained by the fact that judicial 
decisions can be muted by the notion that they simply reflect how a voter already feels. 
For example, a voter whose support of Gore was based upon his or her perception that 
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Gore was more pro-choice than Bush was not likely to prefer Gore merely because Gore 
may have been more likely than Bush to appoint pro-choice judges to the federal courts. 
This does not mean that the case had little impact on the voter; it just means that it 
confirmed what they already believed. This confirmation by a highly credible institution 
could lead to other forms of political participation such as donating to a campaign or 
increased support through public opinion. All of this will be evaluated in the latter pages.  
Similar to Ryden (2002) and Ross (2002), Stephenson Grier (1999) analyzes the 
intersection of Supreme Court decisions and presidential elections while arguing that the 
Court is capable of altering the campaign process. Stephenson Grier argues that a primary 
function of the Court is to facilitate the definition and clarification of candidates and 
party positions on critical issues in the campaign. What the Court says on a major issue 
such as the role of the government in health care can make it easier for parties and 
candidates to sharpen their issues and clarify opposing positions. Stephenson Grier is 
making the point that the courts can play the role of the agenda setter. This notion is 
strongly supported in the literature through Franklin and Kosaki (1989), Johnson and 
Martin (1998), Hoekstra (2000). An issue that is not originally in the limelight during the 
campaign can be brought to focus through a high profile decision and subsequently 
altering the way voters evaluate a candidate. The Supreme Court’s decision and 
becoming a major news story makes it easier for voters to obtain information and thus 
make a decision (Dalton and Wattenberg (1993). This decrease in information costs 
created by the Supreme Court decision could have an impact on the voter’s evaluation of 
the presidential candidate (Downs 1957). 
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A key proposition submitted by Stephenson-Grier that is strongly supported in the 
U.S. Supreme Court literature is the notion that the Supreme Court is most likely to 
receive public attention in a negative light. It is found that the court is more likely to 
become ensnared in partisan combat when it has negated, rather than upheld a policy 
choice made by a state government, another branch of government or diverges from the 
ideological preferences of the public (Durr et al. 2000). This means that candidates 
running for office are more likely to react negatively when a law is ruled unconstitutional 
than when it is simply upheld. This is reflected in separation of powers literature such as 
Segal et al (2011) that find that the Supreme Court is less likely to utilize judicial review 
when the legislation in question is ideologically distant from congress and the president 
(Segal et all 2011). This is a political calculation to avoid attacks from the elected 
branches of government that can alter the institutional integrity of the court. This notion 
of negative attention to the courts in a campaign is important because it can formulate the 
public’s response. Mostly negative attention could mean that the public is more likely to 
respond to a Supreme Court case only when the court is attacking their ideological 
disposition, creating a rally around the flag effect. If the court negates the policy of a 
certain group of people it could bode well for the presidential candidate that aligns with 
the losing side.  
Becker and Feely (1973) still evaluating how the Supreme Court alters the 
presidency comes at the question from a different perspective using an empirical 
approach to Supreme Court decisions that alter the political process. Becker and Feely 
(1973)’s The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions is the only empirical evaluation of how 
the Supreme Court impacts the behavior of the other branches of government. Are 
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Supreme Court decisions capable of altering the political process? While the study is 
certainly outdated, this is a similar question to the one I am asking. Becker and Feeley 
(1973) find that the court has rarely succeeded in using judicial review to prevent the 
president and Congress from gaining any major policies on which they agree. Citing 
examples such as the failed opposition to the New Deal policies, the court has struggled 
to put up a fight against the elected branches of government. The only success the court 
has seen is in the short term delay of such policy goals. While this is a bleaker look on 
how the court alters the policy process, it does provide a window in which the court alters 
the presidency’s behavior. Given the short window in which a campaign is conducted, the 
court could alter policy behavior during the campaign period, thus altering how the public 
evaluates the president.  
Clearly, the literature regarding the Supreme Court’s impact on the presidency in 
and out of the campaign process is limited in scope; however it does come to some 
important conclusions that will impact the theories utilized in the next chapter. In 
summary, I have determined that (1) the field is divided on the level of impact the Courts 
can have on presidential campaigns. Some argue that it does not have an impact while 
others contend the courts influence is potentially growing. (2) The field has yet to study 
the extent of Supreme Court’s influence through the lens of salient cases. (3) The 
increasing party polarization in the U.S. could have a significant impact on voter 
evaluation of presidential candidates making it easier for them to formulate ideological 
stances. (4) The Court can act as an agenda setter that brings new issues to the forefront 
during a campaign, thus making  it easier to gather information. (5) Public reaction to 
Supreme Court decisions tends to be focused more through negative attention. 
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Campaigns are more likely to mobilize an effort to demonize the court if it rules a law 
unconstitutional or if it negates one of their policy stances more so if the court is 
affirming their beliefs or stances. This means that a rally around the flag effect will is 
more likely to occur than a confirmation effect.  Lastly (6), the Supreme Court’s window 
of influence is limited due to the relative power of the other branches in the policy 
making process. However, for the sake of this study, the size of the window is somewhat 
irrelevant due to the short campaign period.  
Presidency’s Influence on the U.S. Supreme Court Literature: 
Now shifting away from the more topical side of the judicial politics literature 
concerned with how the Supreme Court impact the presidency, it is important to have an 
understanding of where the field is actually concentrating their research. Rather than 
focusing on how the U.S. Supreme Court alters the behavior of the president, the field has 
focused on the adverse relationship. The following will provide a brief overlap of the 
ways in which the political science field has evaluated and measured how the presidency 
impacts the courts through the appointment process, the influence of the Solicitor 
General, and the president’s power to persuade. 
A cornerstone piece in political science literature and a required piece to discuss 
in any judicial politics work is Dahl (1957). Dahl (1957) acts as the standing piece for the 
legalistic model and evaluates the manner in which the U.S. Supreme Court can make 
policy decisions by going outside the established legal criteria found in precedent, statute 
and the Constitution. Dahl (1957) finds that the Courts are extremely limited in this 
ability, finding that the patterns of decision making within the Supreme Court reflect the 
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appointments presidents make to the Court and the dominant viewpoint among the 
lawmaking majority. Dahl (1957) suggests that the Courts have little institutional 
advantage to disagree with the president, Congress, or the public because it jeopardizes 
the institutional legitimacy of the Court. Scigliano (1971), and Segal, Timpone and 
Howard (2000) echo this notion but extends the emphasis on the power of the president’s 
appointment powers. They argue that the president’s appointment power provides him 
with significant influence over the conducted behavior of the courts. Lindquist et al 
(2000) find this to be a questionable hypothesis and seeks to find the necessary conditions 
for the president to successfully maintain strong influence over Supreme Court Justices. 
They argue that in order for this hypothesis to be true the following conditions must be 
met: (1) the President must have the opportunity to appoint one or more justices; (2) 
when multiple justices are appointed, they must vote cohesively relative to the Court as a 
whole; and (3) voting cohesion among multiple appointments must further the President's 
(and the political majority's) policy preferences. Among modern Presidents, these 
conditions were fulfilled only by the Nixon and Reagan appointments, showing the 
unlikelihood of this from consistently occurring. This would suggest that in actuality the 
president’s influence over his appointees is somewhat limited. Therefore, an incumbent 
president during the campaign cycle would not have an unnecessary amount of influence 
over the Supreme Court justices that would prevent them from making a decision that 
could alter the voting calculus of the population. This is a positive sign for this particular 
study which relies on an independent judiciary that serves as an independent evaluating 
measure for the population to look to for voting guidance. Szmer and Songer (2005) also 
support this idea of an independent judiciary by finding that the assumption that 
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presidential success in the judicial appointment process will lead to a nominee that will 
mirror presidential policy goals is flawed. 
Another commonly studied phenomenon in the judicial politics literature 
concerning Supreme Court and presidential relationships is work concerning the 
influence of the Solicitor General (SG). Given the close working relationship between the 
presidential appointed Solicitor General and the U.S. Supreme Court, the SG serves as an 
excellent proxy to monitor the president’s influence. It can be argued that the Solicitor 
General acts as an agent of the president when working with the Supreme Court that 
seeks to advance the political agenda of the current administration. “The solicitor general 
is appointed by the president and represents the interests of the executive branch before 
the Supreme Court. One would expect considerable policy and ideological agreement 
between the appointing president and the Solicitor General” (Meinhold and Shull 1998, 
528). The notion that the president appoints the Solicitor General is a constitutional fact, 
and is irrefutable; however the manner in which the Solicitor General represents the 
president’s ideological or policy goals through its actions in the court have yet to be fully 
determined. Whether the SG is an agent of the president or not is important to determine 
due to the high rate of success the SG experiences on the court (Nicholson and Collins 
2007). O’Connor (1983), Segal (1988), Salokar (1992), Meinhold and Shull (1998) and 
Graham (2003) argue that the Solicitor General is indeed a surrogate for the president and 
influences the court in a manner that is consistent with his policy and ideological 
preference.  
However, more recent and methodologically sound research has found the 
relationship between the President and Supreme Court to be more neutral in nature. 
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McGuire (1995) and Pacelle (2006) argue that the Solicitor General serves an important 
information gathering purpose and should be viewed as a credible and reliable source of 
information for the courts. “The SG seeks to provide the justices with accurate and 
balanced information and assure that the briefs maintain a high level of professionalism” 
(Pacelle 2006, 318). To argue that in this information providing role that the SG is 
serving as the president’s instrument would be an overstatement. Therefore, it is 
imperative to understand that the SG is capable of acting in other fashions that do not 
include advancing the president’s administrative goals. Nicholson and Collins (2007) 
examine the legal, political, and administrative factors that affect the SG’s decision to 
participate as an amicus curiae provider. Nicholson and Collins find that political 
explanations for the SG’s participation in the amicus process have been largely 
overstated. The only hypothesis they found to be statistically significant was that the SG 
would be more likely to file an amicus brief in a politically salient case. However, they 
found no evidence that supported the claim that the SG is more likely to file amicus when 
the cases are important for the president’s policy agenda or when the SG is ideologically 
aligned with the court. Wolfrath (2009) further examines this relationship and shows that 
it is politically dangerous for the Solicitor General to blindly advocate presidential policy 
goals. Wohlfarth argues that the politicization of the policy agendas directly affects the 
status among the justices in a negative manner. This article acts as a necessary response 
to Neudstadt (1980) and the ability of the president to persuade other political actors. 
Wohlfarth (2009) found that an SG who solely pursues the president’s ideological 
position will lose credibility and its standing amongst the court. 
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It is important to understand the literature concerning the Solicitor General and 
the U.S. Supreme Court because the SG serves as the primary liaison between the two 
branches and signifies the level of autonomy the Court has in regard to the cases it hears 
and rules upon. The level of dependence or independence, similar to the issues noted in 
the presidential appointment section is important because they can directly impact the 
manners in which the Court deals with an incumbent president. This study looks at 
presidents during election cycles, but also while in office through presidential approval 
ratings. I need to be sure that the Supreme Court is not hindered in its ability to makes 
rulings that could alter public opinion away from the president in office. The literature 
would suggest that the SG does not have a disproportional level of influence in the courts 
thus allowing for the hypothesized relationship between the courts and populace to exist. 
While the SG plays a primary role in some of the cases rendered, it serves more of an 
information gathering role than a controlling role. 
The last section concerning the relationship between the presidency and the U.S. 
Supreme Court that I want to briefly address concerns the president’s ability to impact the 
other branches of government through the concept of political capital. Neustadt (1980) 
argues that presidential power is the ability to persuade and the shared powers among the 
branches of government allow the president to utilize his influence to set policy agendas. 
In this particular case the president would be using his capital to impact the Courts. The 
modern president is expected to do more than their constitutional authority allows them 
to, and therefore presidents must rely on the power to persuade to influence final policy 
outcomes. “In a government of “separated institutions and sharing powers,” they yield 
them to all sides. With the array of vantage points at his disposal, the President may be 
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far more persuasive than his logic or charm could make him” (Neustadt 1980, 32). The 
basis of the argument Neustadt presents is that the president has a large source of political 
capital and it allows him to impact the policy and decisions made within the other 
branches of government. It is quite possible for the Courts in fear of institutional 
retribution to seek to appease the president in their decision making. Obviously the 
judicial branch wants to maintain its level of legitimacy and autonomy, and believes that 
avoiding conflict with the president is the best way to do this. This notion is supported by 
Segal et all (2011) who find that the court is less likely to utilize judicial review when the 
legislation in question is ideologically distant from congress and the president (Segal et 
all 2011). This notion of presidential capital while strong is limited and forces president 
to pick and choose the battles they want to spend political capital on especially during an 
election cycle. Wohlfarth (2009) depicts this through the SG as described above and 
notes that when the political capital is spent, the president no longer is able to control the 
Supreme Court’s decisions. Overall, it would seem that presidential capital will play a 
role in the Supreme Court’s calculus to render a decision counter to the president’s 
agenda; however, it should not serve as a detriment to it all together. This is a limited 
political power held by the president and should not fully constrain the court for the sake 
of this research design.  
Mondak (1992) discusses the issue of political capital similar to that of Neustadt 
(1980) but applies it to the U.S. Supreme Court. He argues that the U.S. Supreme Court 
can introduce institutional support in its efforts to generate legitimacy for a particular 
policy, but in doing so the court risks its institutional backing by advancing controversial 
decisions. Therefore, the institutional legitimacy functions as expendable capital for the 
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Supreme Court. This notion of political capital within the Supreme Court is important 
because it shows that the court also uses its persuasive powers to effect policy. This logic 
can be extended toward impact other areas of policy or politics such as presidential 
elections.  
U.S. Supreme Court and Public Opinion Literature: 
Now that I have developed our understanding of the manners in which the 
Supreme Court and presidency interact and influence each other, it is imperative that we 
now shift to the other key actor in this particular research question: the public. The 
primary question at hand still stands as evaluating the impact high salient Supreme Court 
cases have on voter’s evaluation of presidential candidates and presidential performance. 
At this point this study has only discussed literature concerned with half of this 
relationship. The following will take an in-depth look at how the U.S. Supreme Court 
reacts to and alters public opinion.  
 Given the overlapping question at hand, it is important to determine if the 
Supreme Court is capable of influencing the policy preferences or decisions of the public. 
Does the U.S. Supreme Court influence the policy preferences of the public? Franklin 
and Kosaki (1989) argued that the U.S. Supreme Court historically has played the role of 
the “republican schoolmaster” in which through its explanation of the law and its high 
moral standing, the Court may give the populace an example of the way they should 
behave. Thus through the highly credible Supreme Court the populace has a model of 
behavior for the populace. Ultimately, they find that the court has a strong influence on 
the structure of public opinion and allows the public to further crystalize their beliefs. 
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Franklin and Koaski (1989) are supported by the literature through Marshall (1989), 
Johnson and Martin (1998), Hoekstra (2000), Hoekstra (2003), Stimson (2004) and 
Stoutenborough et al (2006). All of these contend to some extent that the Court is capable 
of persuading or altering public opinion on a particular subject.  
 The paragraph above simply determines if the Court has some impact on the 
manner in which the public make public policy decisions, however it does not go into the 
extent to which the Court is capable of doing so. Within the judicial politics field there 
are competing degrees of confidence in which the court can alter public opinion. Scholars 
such as Franklin and Kosaki (1989), Marshall (1989) and Stimson (2004) contend that the 
Court’s in general have persuasive powers that can pull the public’s opinion in one 
direction or the other. This subsection of the literature is highly supportive of the 
hypotheses that the U.S. Supreme Court plays a vital role in the way presidential 
candidates and incumbent presidents are evaluated.  
  Other political science scholars contend that the Supreme Court is capable of 
altering public opinion, but in a more conditional fashion. Johnson and Martin (1998), 
Hoekstra (2000) and Stoutenborough et al (2006) argue that this effect is conditional 
based upon the salience of the case in question. Johnson and Martin (1998) analyzing 
public opinion data before and after the Supreme Court ruled on a highly visible abortion 
case (Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 1989) find that Supreme Court influence 
does impact public attitudes but only during high salient issues. The Johnson and Martin 
(1998) article is extremely relevant given the research design approach utilized. I use 
similar pre and post-test analysis to perform a more comprehensive evaluation of this 
phenomenon and then apply it to presidential elections. While the Johnson and Martin 
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(1998) approach is useful it is severely narrow in its scope. The research design being 
implemented in this study expands upon Johnson and Martin (1998) due to an improved 
measure of case salience and a widened scope of application to public opinion. 
Stoutenborough et al (2006) looking at cases concerning homosexual civil rights, argues 
that the Court’s ability to influence public opinion is a function of the salience of the 
issue, the political context and case specific factors at the aggregate level. This basically 
echoes the arguments made by Johnson and Martin (1998) but applies it to a different 
sector of salient cases. Overall, the point being made is that public opinion and the U.S. 
Supreme Court is interrelated, but due to the complexity of the topics in question should 
be limited to only highly salient cases. It would be difficult to expect average American 
citizens to use an obscure Supreme Court ruling that received little media attention to 
factor into their evaluation of politics. However, if the case is salient enough and has 
enough media attention, one can safely assume that it will impact the populace’s decision 
making capabilities. This issue of case salience is extremely important and will be 
discussed in greater detail in the next section.  
 Grosskopf and Mondak (1998) evaluate the dynamics of public opinion to 
determine if positive or negative reactions to the decisions rendered by the U.S. Supreme 
Court have different effects. Looking at the impact of high profile decisions and 
comparing them to fluctuations in public opinion polls, they find that agreement with the 
rulings did affect the perceptions of the court in a positive way, but only marginally. 
However, disagreement with the decision laid out by the court substantially reduced the 
confidence of the public in the court. This finding paired with the evidence provided by 
Stephenson-Grier (1999) presented earlier would lead us to conclude that negative 
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attention to the U.S. Supreme Court is more powerful than positive attention to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. This has significant implications on the study in question. According to 
the literature, I should expect to see greater levels of fluctuation in public opinion or 
campaign donations when the majority of the public disagree with the decision laid down. 
At this point, the notion of positive confirmation from a credible branch of government 
appears to be less likely to explain the public’s reaction to a Supreme Court case during 
presidential elections. 
Political Knowledge in the United States Literature:  
 Transitioning to the fourth section of the literature review, I look to the literature 
discussing American political knowledge and their capacity to make complex political 
connections. A major component of the theory for this research projects consists of the 
public being aware of the Supreme Court decision being rendered, reacting to the 
ideological stance of the ruling and thus using its decision to make an informed political 
decision in regard to evaluating a presidential candidate or an incumbent president. In 
order for this to occur I need to first evaluate the extent to which American citizens are 
capable of making such decisions.  
 “Americans are in fact indifferent to much that transpires in politics, hazy of its 
principal players, lackadaisical regarding debates that preoccupy Washington, ignorant of 
basic facts that the well informed take for granted and unsure about the policies advanced 
by presidents” (Kinder 1983, 390). The capacity of an everyday citizen to acquire 
political knowledge and then have the ability to apply it in a political context has been up 
for debate since the early 1950’s. Original staples in American behavioralist theory like 
27 
 
Converse (1964), Campbell et all (1960) argue that the average American citizen is 
ideologically “innocent” and incapable of having a consistent opinion. While the 
magnitude that comes with these articles is difficult to refute, the manner in which they 
come to their conclusions can be. I’d contend along with many in the field that the 
understanding of American voting capabilities to gather political knowledge is grossly 
underestimated. These staple behavioralist theories advanced by Converse (1964) or 
Campbell et al (1960) were plagued by outdated research designs and a lack of 
consistency within the question methods. They utilized an open-ended interview 
approach which required those being questioned to have a very high level of political 
understanding to meet the necessary level to be labeled as politically sophisticated. I 
would argue that the standard average Americans were held to in these studies were too 
high and incorrectly label average Americans as misinformed and unable to formulate 
political opinions.  
Page and Shapiro (1992) provide an alternative mode of questioning involving 
frames that make it easier for average Americans to understand. The use of framing 
reduces the amount of error substantially, and provides a much clearer picture of 
American political knowledge. This is one new method that has produced results that has 
led to a more optimistic view of public opinion and its research. Using this new and 
improved method of questioning Page and Shapiro (1992) found that the American public 
as a group are capable of holding stable opinions on public policy. They analyze public 
opinion in the aggregate rather than on an individual level and determine that while an 
individual opinion may fluctuate randomly around a central tendency, his long term 
preferences will be stable despite periodic fluctuations. 
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Another way in which the average voter can adapt to the ever changing political 
environment while gathering the necessary knowledge to make informed decisions is 
through shortcuts/heuristics. “It has become common to argue that citizens can overcome 
their informational shortfalls and make sense of politics by taking advantage of 
judgmental shortcuts, or heuristics” (Sniderman 1983, 221). The concept behind the 
utilization of a heuristic is that citizens are politically unsophisticated due to a lack of 
either motivation or ability and therefore rely on a series of shortcuts which enable them 
to make political decisions. Sniderman (1983) and Niemi Weisberg, and Kimball (2011) 
argue that in order to take advantage of a heuristic one must know where they stand on a 
particular issue, and weight it by the difference in how they feel liberals and 
conservatives view the issues. In this particular case, I could argue that the Supreme 
Court case decision submitted and the front page article in the New York Times 
describing the case can act as a shortcut for citizens to evaluate the presidential candidate 
or president in question.  
The overall point being made in regard to American political knowledge is that 
while originally the political science literature suggested that average citizens are 
incapable of making informed political decisions or making connections from one 
stimulus to the other, advanced research has lead us to believe that this may not be the 
case. It is certainly plausible to argue that the average American citizen with enough 
motivation and information could make the connection between a Supreme Court 
decision and presidential policy position. This connection is even more plausible when 
the parties and politicians in question have become increasingly polarized. This allows 
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for political questions to be depicted in a much easier light and allows us to easily discern 
where candidates stand on the political spectrum.  
U.S. Supreme Court Case Salience Literature: 
The final area of discussion in this literature review needs to be the evolution of 
Supreme Court case salience data and my subsequent justification for the utilization of 
the New York Times Case Salience Measure. For the sake of this research project a 
salient case will be defined as a U.S. Supreme Court decision that has received a large 
amount of attention from the public. To properly assess the impact Supreme Court cases 
can have on the public’s evaluation of the president, it is important to only consider cases 
that are likely to capture the attention of the public and could be applied to the president’s 
policy platform. Case salience plays a prominent role in the judicial politics literature 
considering that varying case levels will create different effects within the behavior of the 
Court. For example, as seen in Maltzman and Wahlbeck (1996) one could ask if Chief 
Justices are more likely to assign themselves as the majority opinion writer on issues they 
deem important or if intra-court bargaining is more common over the resolution of 
landmark disputes as in Murphy (1963) and Epstein and Knight (1998). In both of these 
research questions a measure determining what cases are indeed important or salient and 
what cases are not important or non-salient. However, the appropriate salience measure 
for one particular question in judicial politics is not essentially the correct salience 
measure for another research question. The following will describe a series of potential 
case salience measures but will ultimately explain why the New York Times Case 
Salience measure is the most appropriate for this research question. 
 Slotnick (1978), Maltzman and Wahlbeck (1996), Epstein and Knight (1998) and 
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Wahlbeck, Spriggs, and Maltzman (1998) have all developed their own unique forms of 
case salience measures that appropriately fit into their specific research design. For 
example, Maltzman and Wahlbeck (1996) developed a measure of case salience using the 
number of amicus curiae participation as an indicator of case salience. While this is 
certainly a valid way to measure salience because it indicates third party interest into a 
particular Supreme Court case, it would not be as useful in this particular context. In this 
research project, I am looking to access the public’s use of high profile Supreme Court 
cases and its impact on the evaluation of presidential candidates. What is salient to an 
interest group, corporation, NGO, or governmental institution providing an amicus brief 
may not be the same as an average American citizen. Therefore, this study would need to 
utilize a salience measure that focuses on tools used by average citizens and clearly 
indicates to the American population that the case is important and should be considered. 
This is where the New York Times Salience measure comes in. 
Epstein and Segal (2000) provide us with an alternative approach to measuring 
issue salience that focuses on media coverage. The idea is extremely simple: if the media 
covers the case it therefore must be salient. An issue is salient when a lot of people are 
aware of the issue and thus allowing the population to form an opinion on the subject. In 
order for people to make an educated decision about the Supreme Court decision in 
question and thus apply it to their evaluation of the president in question, they must be 
aware of the case and be able to comprehend the issues in question. Epstein and Segal 
(2000) ultimately argue that the best measure of salience is focused around any case that 
appears on the front page of the New York Times the day directly following the 
announcement of the court’s decision. The logic behind this argument assumes that the 
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highly visible and widely read New York Times would not post the information about the 
U.S. Supreme Court case unless it felt its viewers would deem it important. The New 
York Times serves as the most appropriate publication to use in this measure because it is 
aimed at general national readership that avoids a regional bias, and is one of the most 
widely read newspapers throughout the country. Using this measure as an indicator of 
case salience is the most appropriate for this study because it is readily accessible to the 
American public and serves as an indication to the populace that they need to pay 
attention to the Supreme Court’s behavior. As argued in Gibson and Calderia (2007) most 
research suggests that the public is woefully ignorant of the everyday actions within the 
Supreme Court. It is an institution that tends to operate outside the limelight and receives 
little media attention. However, when the New York Times decides to publish their 
actions on the front page, it could indicate to the public that it is an important case and is 
most likely receiving news coverage from other media outlets as well. By reading the 
explanation about the case in the New York Times citizens become primed to expand 
upon what they read and apply it to new areas. Therefore, the New York Times Case 
Salience measurement will be used as the indicator for high profile cases.  
At this point I have evaluated the literature concerning both sides of the 
relationship between the U.S. Supreme Court and the presidency, the relationship 
concerning the U.S. Supreme Court and public opinion, the American populations 
capacity to process political knowledge and deal with issues regarding the U.S. Supreme 
Court, and finally the issue of case salience associated with using the New York Times 
Case Salience measure that will as the basis for the sample of cases studied. Now that 
there is a basic understanding of the political science and judicial politics literature, I can 
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now transition into the next chapter which will discuss the theoretical justifications for 
my overlapping arguments and the hypotheses that will serve as the foundation for the 
following research design.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
THEORY 
 
The state of the literature described in the prior chapter depicts a gap in the 
political science field that ignores the possibility for the U.S. Supreme Court to have a 
significant impact on the way in which American voters evaluate the presidency. While 
there has yet to be a direct answer to this question, there are indirect findings that justify 
investigating the potential relationship. A subset of these academic justifications can be 
exemplified through the U.S. Supreme Court’s positive impact on public opinion 
(Stoutenborough et al 2006), increasing partisanship in politics that leads to clear 
ideological distinctions in Supreme Court rulings (Ross 2002), the American public’s 
reliance on cues to make voting decisions (Sniderman 1983) and the high level of 
institutional credibility associated with the U.S. Supreme Court (Mondak 1992, Gibson, 
Calderia, and Kenyatta-Spence 2003). While this is simply an abridged list of factors that 
suggest that the U.S. Supreme Court indeed can have an impact on the presidential 
election process or simply the evaluation of the president in office, it does provide some 
justification to proceed further down the rabbit hole and ask the necessary questions.  
The objective of this chapter is to clearly outline the cause and effect relationship 
between the highly salient Supreme Court cases and its potential impact on the public’s
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evaluation of the presidency. Overall, I argue that voters can use U.S. Supreme Court 
cases as information cues that stimulate either a positive or negative reaction toward the 
presidential candidate or incumbent president that aligns with the ideological disposition 
of the ruling. I will present hypotheses that support this notion and contest that the U.S. 
Supreme Court will indeed have a significant impact in this relationship. The following 
will first describe the theoretical justifications for the arguments briefly mentioned above. 
Secondly, I present the two overlapping hypotheses that will guide the remainder of the 
research design and will describe how to expect the results to look. Lastly, I will discuss 
the importance of this research question and the potential implications the confirmation 
of my theories will have on the field.  
Theoretical Justifications 
 The literature review in the chapter before presented the general expectations 
within the political science field and I intend to utilize that information and apply it to 
potential expectations for the research question at hand. I argue that there will be either a 
positive or counter-mobilizing effect associated with high profile U.S. Supreme Court 
cases in regard to presidential approval ratings, public opinion polls and campaign 
donations toward presidents in office and presidential candidates. The following will 
explain the train of thought that justifies this overall argument. 
 Due to the increasing degrees of party polarization in the U.S. (Abramowitz 
(2011), Niemi, Weisberg, and Kimball (2011), Hetherington (2011)) and from the 
behavior exhibited by Supreme Court Justices during oral arguments (Johnson et al 
2009), the language utilized in their written opinions, and their next-to predictable voting 
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behavior, it has become possible to divide the sides of a Supreme Court decision along 
ideological lines (Spaeth et al 2012). Generally, the arguments before the Court are 
presented through a lens that is supported by a conservative ideology countered by an 
argument presented through a lens supported by a liberal ideology or vice versa. With 
this ideological breakdown available, I argue that voters can use the U.S. Supreme Court 
cases as information cues (Sniderman 1982) that stimulate a positive or negative reaction 
toward the president or presidential candidate that identifies with the rulings. Page and 
Shapiro (1992) argue that the American public is capable of making political decisions 
when the questions are framed in an easier manner. I would contend that a Supreme 
Court case between Side A acting in a conservative manner and Side B acting in a liberal 
manner could be viewed as a framed set of options that the public could easily utilize. For 
example, the Affordable Health Care Act decision that occurred in the summer of 2012 
clearly broke down along partisan lines in which Democratic candidate Barack Obama 
supported the more liberal decision that would seek to uphold the provisions of 
Affordable Health Care while the Republican candidate Mitt Romney supported the more 
conservative decision that would strike the law down.  The argument here is that the way 
in which the Supreme Court rules on the case can have an important impact on election 
outcomes or at least the overall assessment of the president. In essence, the populace 
potentially has an extremely credible political institution in the U.S. Supreme Court 
(Mondak 1992) (Gibson, Calderia, Kenyatta-Spence 2003) assessing the overall validity 
or constitutionality of each of the candidate’s platforms. This logic will be applied to all 
high profile U.S. Supreme Court cases that appear on the front page of the New York 
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Times (Epstein and Segal 2000) due to their level of media attention and their potential 
weight on the potential voting calculations or the assessment of current presidents.  
General Overlapping Arguments/Hypotheses 
 Now that the overall justification for why I am pursuing this research question is 
established, it is now possible to venture into what should be expected within the results. 
I argue that the U.S. Supreme Court will indeed have a significant impact on the 
population’s assessment of presidential candidates and incumbents and that it will 
manifest itself in two equally feasible scenarios. Given the literature discussed thus far, I 
would hypothesize that high profile Supreme Court cases can have either an Affirmation 
effect or a Counter-Mobilization effect on the population in general. The following 
paragraphs will describe each of these in detail. 
 One potential way in which the U.S. Supreme Court can affect voter’s assessment 
of presidential policy or platform is through the affirmation of the public’s ideological 
beliefs. Under this hypothesis, voters who align ideologically with the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruling will see their political beliefs confirmed by the highly credible court and 
thus encourage them to increase their support for the candidate who also aligns with the 
ruling. Having the Supreme Court confirm the constitutionality or the credibility of a set 
of political beliefs could act as positive reinforcement and serve as a catalyst for an 
increase in political participation. The public, feeling their understanding of politics 
confirmed, could seek out those who also align with that particular ideology and award 
the presidential candidate or president in office with either higher level of approval or 
through donating to a campaign. The literature supports this potential effect and can be 
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exemplified when looking at Franklin and Koaski (1989) who argue that the Supreme 
Court can play the role of a “Republican Schoolmaster” in which they inform the public 
on the best ways to conduct their behavior and that the Court has a positive impact on 
how the public formulate opinion on policy. The affirmation of the population’s beliefs 
should create a higher probability that a voter will provide a positive assessment of the 
candidate in question or be more willing to donate funds to the campaign. Stratman 
(1998) found that the timing of public donations to campaigns often coincide with key 
legislative debates taking place in congress. This suggests that when there is a topic of 
importance being discussed in the legislature dominating the news cycle; people are more 
willing to donate to a campaign. I do not see why this same logic or causal mechanism 
cannot be applied to when the U.S. Supreme Court dominates the news cycle over policy 
issues that pertain to the president. Therefore I present the first general hypothesis that 
will serve as a guiding force for the remainder of this study:  
Affirmation Effect Hypothesis: High salient U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions will have an Affirmation Effect in which the subset of the 
population that ideologically aligns with the decision rendered will 
increase their support for the candidate or president who also 
ideologically aligns with the decision through increases in presidential 
approval ratings, public opinion surveys or campaign donations. 
 One thing to consider with the Affirmation hypothesis is that it will most likely 
have a more subtle impact on candidate assessment than the Counter-Mobilization 
hypothesis below. As the literature suggests, public reaction to the U.S. Supreme Court is 
tempered when they agree with the decision at hand (Grosskopf and Mondak 1998) 
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(Stephenson-Grier 1999). Affirmation is a weaker mobilizing tool because it does not 
create a particular reason to act politically. Unlike, the Counter-Mobilization hypothesis 
the public will not be reacting to a catalyst that threatens the way they think. Thus, I 
should expect the affirmation hypothesis to be less clearly demonstrated than the 
Counter-Mobilization hypothesis. I would argue though that it will be more likely to see 
positive fluctuation in presidential approval ratings or public opinion polls in association 
with the affirmation effect than it will with large increases in campaign finance. Public 
opinion is most likely to capture the Affirmation effect due to the relative lack of action it 
requires. Participating in a poll is far less costly than donating to a campaign. Given that I 
expect those who experience the Affirmation effect to be less inclined to participate 
politically than one who is Counter-Mobilized.  
 Transitioning to the other primary hypothesis, I look toward the Counter-
Mobilization hypothesis. It is equally if not more likely to assume that a U.S. Supreme 
Court case will have the adverse effect on the population that does not match up with the 
ideological disposition of the decision. Those who do not align ideologically with the 
Court’s decision could feel as if their beliefs were under attack from the Court and thus 
heavily mobilize an effort to support a president or presidential candidate that is willing 
to oppose such a ruling. This negative reaction to the decision rendered can be described 
almost as a rally around the flag effect for the candidate who does not align ideologically 
with the court. Baker and O’Neal (2001) using a similar New York Times index 
incorporated in this study, found that the size and appearance of the rally depends on how 
the crisis is presented to the public in terms of media coverage, bipartisan support, and 
White House spin. This means that if the campaigns in question decide to use the 
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negative ruling from U.S. Supreme Court case as a rallying cry in support of one of their 
policy issues it could lead to a huge boost in support. Ross (2002) and Stephenson-Grier 
(1999) show us that politicians have a history of using Supreme Court decisions to rally 
political support whereas Grosskopf and Mondak (1998) show that negative attention to 
the Court can have a powerful impact on public opinion. All of these factors lead us to 
assume that a Counter-Mobilization effect in regard to high salient U.S. Supreme Court 
cases during the evaluation of the presidency is possible.  
Unlike the Affirmation effect in relation to public opinion polls, the Counter-
Mobilization effect is more likely to show its effects in campaign donations. This is the 
case because campaign donations are the most proactive of the options examined here for 
a voter to impact the political process. During this Counter-Mobilization process, voters 
feel that their ideological views are under attack from the courts. They need to find a way 
to elect a president that will fight the court on the issues they deem important. The best 
way to do this, I would argue, is to donate to that particular candidate. While they will 
also provide a position message for a public opinion poll, I think the donation would be 
more powerful and prevalent. With this in mind I offer the second general hypothesis for 
this study: 
Counter-Mobilization Hypothesis: High salient U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
will have a Counter-Mobilization Effect, in which the subset of the population that 
does not ideologically align with the decision rendered will increase their support 
for the president or presidential candidate who also does not align ideologically 
with the decision. 
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 Both the Affirmation Hypothesis and the Counter-Mobilization Hypothesis will 
serve as the primary assumption for the remainder of the study. Chapter 4, 5 and 6 seek to 
execute the research design in question, but at all times will be looking to confirm or 
deny the two primary hypotheses described above. Another consideration that needs to be 
noted is the nature of the two hypotheses in question. Given the nature of the data and the 
general expectations of the hypotheses, I must note that this analysis is conducted on the 
aggregate level rather than the individual level. Given that panel data on a day by day 
basis was unavailable, I was forced to aggregate the focus of the study to look at 
population trends in general. Both hypotheses are assessing general population trends in 
regard to Court’s influence on the public’s assessment of the presidency and ultimately 
seek to determine if the population acts in either an Affirmation and Counter-
Mobilization fashion.   
It is important to note the degree of difficulty that is associated with the first two 
angles being pursued in Chapters 4 and 5. I would expect to find that the campaign 
donation data utilized in Model 3 will be more likely to capture the hypothesized results 
above than the public opinion data used in Models 1 and 2. I make this claim given data 
complications that will be discussed in greater detail in the latter chapters as well as the 
broad scope of the public opinion measure itself. Presidential approval ratings and 
general election public opinion polls are created to assess far more than the influence of 
the Supreme Court decision, and thus will be limited in their ability to capture the direct 
effect of the Courts. It is difficult to argue that the limited fluctuations in the polls are 
only due to the Court’s behavior and not associated with other political events that are 
also occurring. Another pitfall associated with the utilization of opinion polls is its 
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reactive nature in general. To participate in a public opinion poll, one must wait to be 
randomly selected among the population and then answer a series of questions, none of 
which will directly ask the public their opinion about the Supreme Court decision. The 
fact that the population must wait to participate in the measure and that there is a strong 
likelihood for many of those who are impacted by the decision will not participate in the 
poll, makes it a difficult measure to utilize. While this is certainly a difficult measure to 
properly pinpoint, this does not provide enough reason to not pursue public opinion as a 
measure in general. A key attribute of this project overall is its broad approach to the U.S 
Supreme Court’s effect on voter evaluation of the presidency. By approaching the topic 
using multiple dependent variables to analyze the phenomenon from different angles, it 
increases the likelihood of understanding the overall relationship as well as potentially 
increasing the robustness of the study in general. Therefore, even though public opinion 
polls present a higher degree of difficulty, it is possible for Models 1 and 2 to support the 
hypotheses. With this understanding toward public opinion polls, it is important to note 
that the third dependent variable concerning campaign donations captures is a far more 
proactive medium of political participation and enables the citizenry to directly place 
themselves into the campaign process by donating money to their desired candidate. This 
is potentially best for this particular study given that I am seeking to assess the public’s 
ability to use the Court’s behavior as a cue for their assessment of presidential viability. 
The overall point being made is that it is far more plausible for a citizen who is impacted 
by the Court’s behavior to get online, go to the candidate’s home page and donate funds 
directly after experiencing Affirmation or Counter-Mobilization than it is for a citizen to 
exhibit these effects through a poll. Therefore, I argue that it is far more likely to capture 
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the hypothesized effects through campaign donations and Model 3 than through public 
opinion polls utilized in Models 1 and 2.  
Before I being conducting the analysis of the hypotheses presented above,  I must 
first explain the importance of the study in question and the theoretical implications of 
finding proof of either the Affirmation or Counter-Mobilization hypothesis during highly 
salient U.S. Supreme Court cases.  
Importance of Study and Implications 
As portrayed in both the introduction and literature review sections, this is an 
extremely important study for the separation of power literature within judicial politics 
because it seeks to answer questions previously ignored. I have argued that the field 
currently suffers from a major gap that disregards the U.S. Supreme Court’s ability to 
impact presidential powers or their electability through high profile decisions. There has 
yet to be a study within political science that examines Supreme Court decisions during 
an election cycle to determine if there is a relationship between fluctuations in public 
opinion polls or spikes in campaign donations. There has not been a study using 
presidential approval ratings, opinion polls or day to day campaign donations in 
conjunction with high profile Supreme Court cases to determine if the public uses these 
cases as voting cues. These media cycle dominating cases could be playing a pivotal role 
in the manners in which citizens evaluate candidates, however one cannot be sure due to 
the fields overall lack of interest in the topic. This study seeks to reset the agenda in 
judicial politics and hopefully engineer interest in the Supreme Court’s capacity to impact 
the other branches of government.  
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Regardless of the results, this research questions poses serious implications for 
not only the literature within the judicial politics area but also areas concerned with 
presidential elections, and U.S. political knowledge and the prevalence of heuristics. This 
study has a wide range of implications that could have an important impact on the field. 
Obviously, any result will help judicial scholar assess the relationship between the U.S. 
Supreme Court and the presidency, but if in the results section of this study I find that 
there is a positive relationship between the Courts high profile decisions and swings in 
public opinion or donations it could alter the manner in which president’s view the 
importance of Supreme Court nominations and the weight of each decisions in and out of 
election cycles. While current politics already places heavy value on each Supreme Court 
nomination, finding that court rulings are capable of altering the public’s voting calculus 
would certainly signal to each political party that they want to have the ideological upper 
hand. Without it, not only would they be subject to unfavorable rulings, but also be 
electorally vulnerable. This would likewise increase the value of each decision rendered 
by the court and could potentially alter the media coverage of the cases in questions.  
Will this study find that the courts have an influence over the presidency that 
extends beyond simple judicial review or will there reach be limited? I would argue that 
the results are less important than the actual testing of the relationship. While it would 
certainly be more interesting to find that the courts have a significant impact on the 
presidency in this area, simply testing the relationship and measuring the court’s reach in 
an area previously ignored is enough justification to pursue the study.  
Political knowledge literature is another area that could be impacted by this study. 
Are American citizens capable of using Supreme Court rulings to use the information 
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provided to help them assess presidential candidates? A positive finding in this study 
would provide a major hit to political scientists who still subscribe to the Converse 
(1964) or Campbell, Converse, Stokes (1960) school of thought that the American public 
is uninformed and incapable of forming political ideology. This study is asking a lot of 
the American population by assuming that they can make the complex connection 
between difficult Supreme Court rulings and applying them to their assumptions toward 
presidential candidates or current presidents. That could be difficult for the politically 
uninformed. However, I am relying on the nature of high profile cases and the priming 
that occurs in reading the front page of the New York Times or at the very least the signal 
sent to other political actors that this is a case relevant to the masses, to assume that it is 
possible. Overall, any positive evidence supporting the expected relationship between the 
U.S. Supreme Court and the presidency in this study would be a major victory for 
scholars who subscribe to Page and Shapiro (1992) or Sniderman (1983) and a positive 
view of the American public’s capacity for political knowledge. It would suggest that the 
American population is indeed capable of making complex political decisions.  
With the basic theoretical framework of the study and the overall implications of 
the project understood, it is now time to begin the actual execution of the research design. 
The next three chapters will individually analyze the data, testing methods, and results of 
the three models described above. Chapter 4 will discuss the data, testing methods, 
analysis and results to evaluate the hypotheses concerning the effect high profile Supreme 
Court rulings have on presidential approval ratings. This pattern will be duplicated for 
both Model 2: public opinion in presidential elections and Model 3: campaign donations 
in presidential elections in Chapters 5 and 6.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
MODEL 1: PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL RATINGS DATA, TESTING METHODS AND 
RESULTS 
 
The previous chapters discussing the introduction, literature review and theory 
have provided the general framework that will guide the remaining sections of this study. 
From the literature review it is deduced that while the judicial politics research has not 
focused directly on how U.S. Supreme Court decisions impact the evaluation of the 
presidency, there are other secondary findings that imply a positive relationship between 
the two; thus making this a necessary study. The theory section outlined the projects 
general hypotheses concerning the research question evaluating the cause and effect 
relationship between high salient Supreme Court cases and its potential impact on the 
public’s assessment of the presidency or potential presidential candidates. This chapter 
seeks to build on this framework by evaluating the likelihood for American citizens to 
use high profile Supreme Court cases in the overall evaluation of presidential 
performance. The proxy in which I intend to evaluate this particular relationship for 
Model 1 will be presidential approval ratings. Therefore, for the sake of this particular 
model, the dependent variable will be the degree of change in presidential approval 
ratings from before and after the U.S. Supreme Court decision paired with the
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independent variable of the U.S. Supreme Court decision’s ideological direction. In effort 
to maximize the number of salient U.S. Supreme Court cases that apply within the data’s 
timeframe I sought to evaluate the presidency in and out of the presidential election 
period. Using presidential approval ratings as a proxy allows us to determine: (1) if U.S. 
Supreme Court cases are utilized in average citizen’s general assessment of the president 
in office, and (2) are they capable or willing to make the complex connection between the 
ideological direction of the decision rendered by the court and the potential ramifications 
it has on the current presidents policy goals? The following pages will describe Model 1 
in further detail while explaining the data utilized, elaborate on the methodology in which 
Model 1 will be executed, and finally I will describe the results of the analysis concerning 
presidential approval ratings and the U.S. Supreme Court.  
Data: 
 Model 1 evaluates the effect high profile U.S. Supreme Court cases have on 
presidential approval ratings from 1993-2012. In essence, this study is analyzing the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s impact on the presidency from the Clinton administration to the current 
Obama Administration. Due to limitations concerning the frequency of public opinion 
data that will be described later in this chapter, I was unable to go back beyond the 
Clinton Administration. Model 1 probes the basic question of whether important Supreme 
Court decisions impact the manner in which American citizens evaluate the current 
president in office. Would a decision that disagrees with the president’s ideological 
compass impact the way in which the people evaluate the president’s policy platform? 
Thus, to effectively evaluate this relationship I will need to acquire data concerning the 
dependent variable of presidential approval ratings, data concerning which cases are 
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highly salient and those that are not, the ideological direction of the decisions decided 
and finally other important variables from the U.S. Supreme Court Database that will be 
used as control variables. The next few paragraphs will describe the data utilized to fulfill 
these necessary criteria. 
 The degree of change between the pre and post-tests in presidential approval 
ratings (Post-test – Pre-Test = degree of change) will serve as the dependent variable for 
Model 1. Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable can be found at the end of the 
data section below. This variable will provide an estimate of the level of change a high 
profile Supreme Court decision creates. However, for the sake of the quasi experimental 
testing method adopted for Model 1 this study requires an enormous amount of data 
assessing the public’s evaluation of presidential performance before and after the U.S. 
Supreme Court case in question to serve as the pre and post-tests. The goal was to find 
presidential approval rating polls that ended the day before the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruling was decided to act as the pre-test and find presidential approval rating polls that 
began the day of after the decision was heard to coincide with the case appearing on the 
front page of the New York Times or other media outlets that deemed the case salient. 
This is the ideal situation, however due to time and resource limitations I was forced to 
get creative with the data processing. For one, the study is required to “go back in time” 
to assess previous phenomenon therefore, and it would not be possible to create my own 
public survey analysis that monitor’s the public’s behavior. These studies are taken in 
real time to assess opinions at the time of these events. A second issue is that polling 
houses generally do not run polls for every day of the year, meaning that using a singular 
polling house such as Gallup for instance, would not be possible. The goal is to have a 
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pre and posttest as close to the events as possible in order to control for other important 
political events that could also influence voters. To remedy this problem I decided to 
employ multiple polling houses’ evaluation of presidential approval ratings as long as 
they phrased their polling question using this specific language: “Do you approve or 
disapprove of the job president X is doing as president? Luckily for this study, the 
general question to assess presidential approval ratings has become standardized and for 
the most part has been consistent. The only issue of non-standardization we run into 
using this multiple polling house process is the interchanging use of likely voters and 
registered voters. Given data limitations, I have made the decision to simply treat these 
two different measuring techniques as a single unit. While far from perfect, this multiple 
polling house approach made it more than possible to successfully create pre and 
posttests for all salient cases during this time period. Below is a list of the multiple 
polling houses employed to compile presidential approval ratings from 1993-2012 that 
were found through the iPoll database: 
American Research Group, NBC/Wall Street Journal, Fox News, 
CBS/New York Times, CNN, Democracy Corps, Politico/George 
Washington University, McClatchy/Marist, Quinnipiac University, Pew 
Research Center, Bloomberg, Allstate/National Journal, Gallup, TIPP, 
Time, PRRI, Harris Polls, LA Times, and Newsweek. 
Questions concerning the validity of the presidential approval rating variable 
would be unfounded due to the consistency in the questioning methods across polling 
houses. While this may not be the most ideal way to test the relationship between the 
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U.S. Supreme Court and presidential approval, this is the most feasible way to perform 
this kind of test, given the data limitations.  
 Once the presidential approval rating data was compiled I was able to apply the 
correct polls to the appropriate U.S. Supreme Court case to establish which polls 
qualified as pre-tests and which polls were posttests. Ideally all pre and post-tests would 
fall the day before and the day after, however in some scenarios that was not possible. 
Therefore, I made the decision to exclude a Supreme Court case from the dataset if there 
was not a poll that ended five days prior to the decision (pretest) or began five days after 
the decision (posttest). The goal is to eliminate other potential political explanations that 
could cause fluctuation in the ratings and the best way to do that is to have the data as 
close as possible to the actual Supreme Court decision. There are countless explanations 
or reasons that play into a citizen’s thought process when answering polling questions, by 
limiting the number of days that pass between the Supreme Court decision and the time 
people take the polls, it limits the opportunity for new political events to be the actual 
reason for fluctuation. In order to ensure that the Supreme Court is actually the catalyst 
for change in the polls, this day after approach must be emphasized.  
Before being able to successfully determine the relationship between high profile 
Supreme Court cases and presidential approval ratings, it is important to determine which 
cases are deemed salient and those that are not. As described in the literature review 
section of this paper, Epstein and Segal (2000) and their New York Times Salience 
measure serve as the criteria to determine salience. When a U.S. Supreme Court case 
finds it decision described on the front page of the New York Times, I can argue that it is 
indeed a salient case and thus should have a considerable impact on the American public. 
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In this case, the media determines if the Court decision is important enough to place it on 
its front page and primes the American public about the Court’s behavior. The Supreme 
Court Database, a National Science Foundation funded dataset, is open to public use and 
serves as the basis for the salience measure along with the source of several of the 
secondary control variables. For the sake of the salience measure however, the Supreme 
Court Database also contains supplementary materials created by other important figures 
in the judicial politics field. Epstein and Segal (2000)’s NYT salience measure along with 
Congressional Quarterly’s landmark case salience measure are deemed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court dataset as adequate measures of study. However, for this particular 
research project, I argue that only the New York Time salience measure is consistent with 
the goals of my study. I hope to evaluate the American public, and thus using a 
measurement that considers what the media (the information source for average citizens) 
deems important rather than not what academic scholars  is essential.  
 Currently, the U.S. Supreme Court Database codes the salience of every Supreme 
Court case decided from 1946-2009. Using this dataset in its current state would thus 
prevent this study from utilizing anything after 2009, preventing me from evaluating the 
Supreme Court’s impact on the second half of the Obama administration and would have 
forced us to ignore all of the data for the 2012 presidential election cycle. I also would 
have missed the impact of landmark U.S. Supreme Court cases such as Arizona v. United 
State (2012) which evaluated the constitutionality of the highly controversial and 
partisanly divided immigration laws in Arizona or Snyder v. Phelps (2011) which ruled 
on the first amendment protections for publicly protesting at a funeral. This was made to 
be national news by the controversial tactics of the Westboro Baptist Church. Therefore, I 
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decided to add to this dataset myself by personally coding all of the U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions after the 2009 Supreme Court term. I utilized the same methodological methods 
employed by Epstein and Segal (2000) to ensure the accuracy of the dataset: 
“To reproduce the NYT approach, we used two sources: the Index to the 
New York Times and LEXIS. A salient case (1) led to a story on the front 
page of the Times on the day after the Court handed it down, (2) was the 
lead (“headlined:) case in the story, and (3) was orally argued and decided 
with an opinion” (Epstein and Segal 2000, 73). 
Following that exact approach, I was able to add 12 new cases to the salience dataset’s 
previous 192, to give us a total of 204 highly salient U.S. Supreme Court cases between 
1993 and 2012. This enables the study to include all presidential approval ratings for the 
Obama administration up to the last salient case rendered by the court. All of this means 
that my particular study will serve as the most up-to-date study of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, at least until the next official term.  
 Finally, there are other important functions The U.S. Supreme Court Database 
will serve for the purpose of this study. Below is a list and description of key variables 
that play a vital role in the testing of the hypotheses: (1) Case ID: Serves as the unifying 
variable in the dataset that describes the term and the case within the term. (2) Issue area: 
This variable separates the cases heard into 14 possible case areas including: Criminal 
Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendments, Due Process, Privacy, Attorneys, Unions, 
Economic Activity, Judicial Power, Federalism, Interstate Relations, Federal Taxation, 
Miscellaneous, and Private Action. I took this variable and created a dichotomous civil 
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liberty variable stressing yes (1) or no (0) if it is a civil liberty case. (3) Decision 
Direction: This variable determines the ideological direction of the decision rendered. 
The decision direction variable serves a critical function within Model 1 and all of the 
other models. The direction of the decision acts as the expected shortcut message the U.S. 
Supreme Court sends to the American public through the New York Times article that 
will potentially trigger a change in evaluation of the presidential candidate. If my 
hypotheses are correct, the decision direction support or opposition to the president in 
office should have an impact on presidential approval ratings. (4) Precedent Alteration:  
Measures if the majority opinion effectively overrules previous court precedent. This will 
be used as a potential control variable. (5) Law Unconstitutionality: Indicates that the 
court either declared a law enacted by Congress unconstitutional. Again, this will serve as 
a basic control variable. (6) Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court provides us with the 
majority on the bench. This control variable will allow us to determine if the margin of 
victory in which the controversial decision was rendered has an impact on the weight of 
the decision among the people. Whether 5-4 decisions have greater impact than 9-0 
decisions is a question that can be considered.  
Table 1A: Dependent Variable Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Presidential Approval 
Rating Degree of Change 
193 .818 4.51 -9 21 
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Table 1B: Independent Variable Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Decision’s Ideological 
Support of President 
201 .433 .497 0 1 
 
Testing Methods: 
 In effort to test Model 1 and the hypotheses associated with it (Affirmation and 
Counter-Mobilization Hypotheses), this study will employ a quasi-experimental approach 
tied into a regression analysis. Quasi-experimental designs, similar to other experimental 
types follows: (1) the testing of descriptive causal hypotheses about manipulable causes, 
(2) incorporates the frequent presence of control groups and pretest measures, and (3) 
enables testing of a phenomenon before and after the stimulus is presented to the subject 
to measure the level of effect (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2002). However, the 
difference for quasi-experimental design is that this method lacks random assignment. 
This is an appropriate tool for this study, because I have decided to only incorporate 
highly salient Supreme Court decisions in the dataset, excluding other non-salient cases.  
For the sake of the research design in Model 1; presidential approval rating data is 
compiled before and after high profile Supreme Court decisions are rendered. This allows 
us to clearly visualize and demonstrate the actual impact the catalyst (salient Supreme 
Court case) will have on the public’s evaluation of the president in office. Thus, it can be 
determined that while testing presidential approval ratings in Model 1, the dependent 
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variable will be the degree of change in presidential approval from the pre-test to the 
post-test (post-test – pre-test = degree of change).  
 With the dependent variable being the degree of change in presidential approval, 
the primary independent variable for Model 1 will be the ideological direction of the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision’s support for the president in office. This measure is a simple 
dummy variable coded as a 1 if the ideology of the decision matched the expected 
ideology of the president in office. The variable is codded as a 0 if it is the opposite and 
the decision opposes the expected ideology of the president. For this study, I am 
assuming that if the president is a member of the Democratic Party his ideological 
disposition will support a liberal decision rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court and vice 
versa for a Republican president. The description for what constitutes a liberal or 
conservative decision direction can be further explained in the code book found in the 
appendixes of the study; however, it is safe to assume that they are consistent with the 
general expectations of the candidate in office. I associate a decision’s ideological 
direction and party of the president in office as support for the decision because 
presidential party is a heuristic/tool used by average American citizens to understand the 
expected behavior of political officials (Sniderman 1982). Remember, I am measuring 
the behavior of average Americans not political scientists which allows us to have less 
complex measures of support. So while it is certainly possible for a presidential candidate 
to hold a view on an issue outside the expected ideological spectrum used in this study or 
simply not have a particular policy stance on the subject, it is equally possible that 
average Americans are unaware of this and thus project these expected viewpoints onto 
the candidates based on partisanship or expected ideology. Meaning that even though a 
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candidate may not have a stance on an issue heard by the Court, it is still possible for 
there to be an effect. For example, a counter-majoritarian effect could occur simply 
because their partisan label would suggest that the too disagree with the ruling. Given 
that we are assessing the general public rather than highly sophisticated political experts, 
an extremely simplistic understanding of ideological direction is employed. 
 While I have described both the dependent variable and the independent variable, 
there are other important controls that could have an impact on the relationship between 
presidential approval ratings and the courts. Model 1 will include the following key 
control variables in its analysis: (1) Civil liberty cases to determine if different types of 
Supreme Court decisions have a greater impact than others. This is coded dichotomously 
where 1 signals the case is a civil liberty issues whereas a 0 signals a non-civil liberty 
issue. Therefore, we can determine if civil liberty cases or non-civil liberty cases have an 
impact on presidential approval ratings. This is certainly possible and thus will be a 
question ran in the analysis. (2) Precedent alteration will be another aspect of the 
Supreme Court decision that will be considered. It is certainly possible to consider a case 
that alters previous Supreme Court precedent to have a greater impact on the public than 
those that do not. The alteration of precedent coded dichotomously as well, could serve as 
a signal to the public that the court’s previous understanding of the law was incorrect and 
thus this is an important issue. (3) Declaration of unconstitutionality could have a similar 
effect as precedent alteration and will also be included in the analysis as a control 
variable. (4) Lastly, majority vote is included to determine the impact the margin of 
victory has on the proposed relationship being tested. A 5-4 decision could have a 
different effect than a 9-0 decision, and thus is something that needs to be accounted for.  
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 It is possible to note that there is a general lack of potential control variables for 
this study. This is possible due to the relative nature of the quasi-experimental approach. 
Given that this study is using data that tests the day before the case was decided and the 
day after to perform the posttest I am potentially controlling for other key political events 
that may occur and effect the evaluation of the president. By performing the time-frame 
as close to the decision as possible, I seek to rule out other potential explanations for 
fluctuations in presidential approval ratings, limiting the need for a large amount of 
controls.  
This is the proposed idea, but it is also equally as possible that presidential 
approval ratings in general is far too broad of an index to measure the Supreme Court’s 
individual effect. When answering a question such as “Do you approve or disapprove of 
the job Barack Obama is doing as president” it is very possible to be considering many 
other factors. One would assume that given the proximity of the time people were asked 
this question to the highly salient case that the U.S. Supreme Court would be the deciding 
influence however that may not be the case. Personal biases, conversations with others in 
various political networks, other key events occurring on the same day could also alter 
this. Therefore, it is necessary to temper the expectations about this potential relationship. 
Regardless of results, using this measure is a necessary step because it serves as the most 
general starting point to assess the impact the U.S. Supreme Court has on the presidency. 
Only from this most general spot of presidential approval can this project progress on to 
other more specific studies like public opinion in elections or even most specific in 
campaign contributions.  
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 The dependent, independent, and multiple control variables will be utilized in a 
simple regression analysis to measure how the typical value of the dependent variable 
changes when any one of the independent variables are held constant (Johnson and 
Reynolds 2012). Ideally, while running the analysis of Model 1, I will find either a 
positive confidence measure signifying support for the affirmation effect or a negative 
confidence measure signifying support for the counter-mobilization effect. Either one of 
these outcomes will require a confidence measure over 95% to be considered a 
significant relationship. Without this threshold being met, it is not possible to conclude 
that U.S. Supreme Court decisions have a significant impact on presidential approval 
ratings.   
 Before moving into the results section of this chapter, it would be useful to 
reiterate the hypotheses and general expectations that motivate Model 1. Below is a list of 
the applicable hypotheses that apply only to Model 1 and the results described below: 
Affirmation Effect Hypothesis: High salient U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions will have an Affirmation Effect in which the subset of the 
population that ideologically aligns with the decision rendered will 
increase their support for the candidate or president who also 
ideologically aligns with the decision through increases in presidential 
approval ratings, public opinion surveys or campaign donations. 
Counter-Mobilization Hypothesis: High salient U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions will have a Counter-Mobilization Effect, in which the subset of 
the population that does not ideologically align with the decision rendered 
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will increase their support for the president or presidential candidate who 
also does not align ideologically with the decision. 
Results: 
 Considering the hypotheses described above and the general argument that 
presidential approval rating should be affected by high profile Supreme Court decisions 
through either an Affirmation effect associated with confirmation of ideological beliefs or 
the opposite Counter-Mobilization effect associated with the defense of one’s ideological 
beliefs; this section describes the results found from the regression analysis conducted. 
Using the data and testing methods also depicted above I do not find any support for the 
hypotheses within Model 1. Below, I describe the outcome of the results for each of the 
primary hypotheses as well as discuss the implications associated with the lack of 
findings. 
Table 2A: Bivariate Regression Analysis: Presidential Approval Ratings 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
t PValue/Significance  
USSC Decision’s Support for 
the President’s Ideology 
.2585227 .6689 0.39 0.700 
Notes: ** p < .05  N= 190 
 Table 2A above depicts the simple bivariate regression between the degree of 
change in presidential approval ratings from the pretest to the posttest (dependent 
variable) and the U.S. Supreme Court case’s support for the president’s perceived 
ideological position based on the direction of the decision (independent variable). This 
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analysis shows that it is not reasonable to assume that there is a correlation between a 
high profile U.S. Supreme Court cases and average American’s perception of presidential 
approval ratings during this specific time period. At this point without controlling for any 
other factors we find little to no support for the Affirmation or Counter-mobilization 
effects. Rather than seeing a positive or negative reaction to these cases depicted through 
the proxy of the presidential approval ratings, it would appear that there is simply little to 
no effect.  
Table 2B: Multivariate Regression Analysis: Presidential Approval Ratings  
Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
t PValue/Significance  
USSC Decision’s Support for 
the President’s Ideology 
.500 0.693 0.72 0.471 
Alteration in Precedent -.635 1.667 -0.38 0.704 
Declaration of 
Unconstitutionality 
.017 0.402 0.04 0.966 
Majority Vote 2.040 1.591 1.28 0.201 
Civil Liberty Cases -1.379 0.825 -1.66 0.099 
Notes: **p < .05  N=190 
 Table 2B above describes the multivariate regression analysis for the Model 1 
regression between the degree of change in presidential approval ratings from the pretest 
to the posttest (dependent variable) and the U.S. Supreme Court case’s support for the 
president’s perceived ideological position based on the direction of the decision 
(independent variable). I find that when analyzing presidential approval ratings from 
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1993 through 2012 in conjunction with the various control variables, there is still no 
significant evidence supporting either the affirmation or counter-mobilization effect in 
regard to presidential approval.  
 The lack of the impact highly salient U.S. Supreme Court cases have on the 
public’s approval of presidential behavior is could be considered relatively surprising. As 
hypothesized, one could justifiably argue that the U.S. Supreme Court either validates 
presidential policy or rejects presidential policy through its controversial decisions. 
However that does not appear to be the case, at the very least in this particular time 
period. It is possible as suggested in the theory chapter, that presidential approval ratings 
are simply an inappropriate proxy to measure U.S. Supreme Court’s impact on the 
populace. The lack of results could be due to the various competing factors that also 
influence presidential approval ratings such as internal disputes between the presidency 
and Congress leading to gridlock, political scandal, poor economic performance, etc. It is 
also possible that the public is simply incapable of making the complex connections 
between U.S. Supreme Court decisions and presidential performance.  
 Given the limited results in the expansive time period between 1993 and 2012, I 
decided to go back to the party polarization literature to determine when exactly 
increased party polarization hit its peak. It is certainly possible that low levels of 
partisanship in the 1990’s or at the very least the lack of media coverage concerning 
partisanship or polarization plays a role in these minimal results. Abramowitz and 
Saunders (2006) argue that partisanship and ideology increased dramatically over the 
years from 0.49 in 1992-200 periods to 0.60 during the 2004 elections. Jacobson (2007) 
contends that disagreement over the Iraqi War lead to drastic increases in polarization. 
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Given this potential increase in polarization levels during this time period, it is possible to 
argue that partisan or ideological lines of the decisions before the court are becoming 
much clearer and easier for the electorate to understand. Increasing levels of partisanship 
could result in higher levels of electoral competition, which could increase the partisan 
clarity of Supreme Court decisions, enabling the populace to make the complex 
connection between the Court’s decision and the president’s policy platform. Thus, given 
this drastic change in the political climate mid-way through the studies general 
timeframe; I re-test the analysis of presidential approval ratings for high salient cases but 
use only cases decided after 2004. Statistically significant findings in this Model would 
have interesting implications on the political polarization literature as well as suggest that 
the political role of the minds of the American people have increased dramatically over 
the years. 
Table 2C: Multiple Regression Analysis: Presidential Approval Ratings 2004-2012 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
t P- Value 
USSC Decision’s Support for 
the President’s Ideology 
.225 1.064 0.21 0.822 
Alteration in Precedent -0.307 3.01 -0.10 0.919 
Declaration of 
Unconstitutionality 
-0.209 0.613 -0.34 0.734 
Majority Vote 2.05 1.847 1.11 0.270 
Civil Liberty Cases -2.661 1.34 -1.99 **0.050 
Notes: **p < .05  N=66 
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Table 2C depicts the regression analysis limited to 2004 through 2012 and finally 
yields an interesting finding. In the time period of 2004-2012 in cases involving civil 
liberty issues (cases coded as criminal, civil rights, 1
st
 amendment, due process and 
privacy in the U.S. Supreme Court Database) I find that high profile Supreme Court 
decisions yield an impact on presidential approval ratings. This would suggest that there 
is some discernible significance between U.S. Supreme Court cases from 2004-2012 that 
deal with civil liberty issues versus those that do not While Table 2C does lend support 
for the relationship between civil liberty cases and fluctuation in presidential approval 
ratings, it does not directly address the potential for an affirmation or counter-
mobilization effect in conjunction with the type of case decided. Therefore, in effort to 
further evaluate this interesting discovery and confirm or deny the validity of the 
proposed hypotheses, I created an interactive variable multiplying the decision’s support 
of the president with the civil liberty case (decisions support of president x civil liberty 
cases) that will allow me to determine if there is truly evidence of the Affirmation or 
Counter-Mobilization effect hypotheses. Below in Table 2D and 2E we find the results 
from the model with the interaction variable. In order to interpret the potential effects of 
the interaction term, I calculated predicted values displayed in Table 2D and 2E below.   
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Table 2D: Interactive Regression Analysis: Civil Liberty Cases that Do Not Support 
the President’s Ideological Position 
Variable Predicted Value 95% Confidence 
Intervals 
95% Confidence 
Intervals 
Predicted Y 2.987 -0.534 6.507 
Civil Liberty Cases 
that do not support the 
President’s Position 
-0.403 -2.220 1.415 
Non- Civil Liberty 
Cases that do not 
support the President’s 
Position 
3.39 -0.234 7.013 
 
Table 2E: Interactive Regression Analysis: Civil Liberty Cases that Support the 
President’s Ideological Position 
Variable Predicted Value 95% Confidence 
Intervals 
95% Confidence 
Intervals 
Predicted Y 1.623 -1.879 5.126 
Civil Liberty Cases 
that support the 
President’s Position 
-0.039 -2.191 2.112 
Non- Civil Liberty 
Cases that support 
the President’s 
Position 
1.663 -2.152 5.478 
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Tables 2D and 2E depicting the predicted values for the interactive variable is 
unable to find any statistically significant relationship between civil liberty cases and the 
decision’s support or lack of support for the president’s ideology. The confidence interval 
in all four cases ranges from a negative to positive interval, which indicates the 
interaction is not statistically significant. This is somewhat surprising given the positive 
indications from the multivariate regression analysis ran in Table 2C suggesting that civil 
liberty cases were indeed statistically significant, but from this point it in the study I find 
no conditional relationship between the type of case and whether it supports the 
president’s position. In sum, I do not find support for either the Affirmation or the 
Counter-Mobilization hypotheses in Model 1.  
The inconclusive findings would suggest that there is no statistically significant 
difference between the U.S. Supreme Court’s influence during the 1993-2012 periods and 
the limited 2004-2012 period. While presidential approval ratings may not be the best 
proxy to measure the U.S. Supreme Court’s influence, these findings hold interesting 
effects for some important theories in the literature. 
A statistically significant finding in Tables 2D and 2E would have provided a 
boast to party polarization literature that suggests that the American political system has 
become increasing polarized (Abramowitz and Saunders 2006; Jacobson 2007), however 
that was not the case. Instead, we find little support for the notion that the American 
political system has increased its level of polarization, at least in regard to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. In a polarized political system, we did not find any statistically 
significant difference in the Court’s ability to use the ideological direction of their 
decisions to impact the assessment of presidential candidates. 
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These inconclusive findings also have a negative impact on the outlook of 
American political knowledge. Positive findings for Model 1 would have suggested that 
the American public is indeed capable of making complex political connections between 
a U.S. Supreme Court decision and how it ties into the president’s policy platform. It 
would have suggested that U.S. Supreme Court decisions who have liberal and 
conservative frames prime the American public to assess the performance of the 
presidency. However, as depicted in the tables above that does not appear to be the case. 
While these results could be due to the impact measurement of presidential approval 
ratings, these findings still provide a discouraging outlook for American political 
knowledge. 
In summary, Model 1 finds no statistically significant support for either the 
Affirmation or Counter-Mobilization effect. This chapter utilized various methodological 
formats (bivariate regression, multivariate regression, interactive variable pr tests) to test 
the relationship between high profile Supreme Court decisions and the public’s 
assessment of the presidency through presidential approval ratings; however I find little 
support for the proposed hypotheses. I contend that these negative results are more a 
reflection of the proxy chosen to test the phenomenon (presidential approval ratings) than 
it is on the U.S. Supreme Court’s ability to impact the other branches of government. As 
alluded to earlier in the chapter, presidential approval ratings are an extremely broad 
survey that simply asks citizens to express their view of the president’s job performance. 
While it is certainly possible for a citizen to read or hear about a U.S. Supreme Court 
case that rejects or confirms the president’s platform and reject accordingly, it is equally 
possible for a variety of other factors to also influence this poll. There are too many 
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counteracting influences that go into presidential approval ratings to view these negative 
results as the ultimate conclusion for this relationship. Poor economic performance, great 
economic performance, state of the union addresses, a political gaff, gridlock in 
Congress, partisan squabbling, other events in the news are just an abridged list of 
potential factors that could also tie into a citizen’s calculus when assess presidential 
approval. The primary rational for using presidential approval ratings to assess the 
Court’s ability to influence the public was to maximize the number of salient cases. As 
we will see in the latter chapters, evaluating high salient cases during a limited number of 
election cycles severely constrains the overall number of cases one could use. Prior to 
starting this project, I knew that the chosen measures to assess this phenomenon were 
imperfect, thus to counteract this I decided to test these models in as many ways as 
possible to determine the court’s impact on the presidency. In this chapter, we find little 
support for this relationship, but there are still two different measures to assess.  
Chapter 5 tests Model 2, and the impact U.S. Supreme Court decisions have on 
public opinion polls during a presidential election cycle. This will allow us to determine 
if the U.S. Supreme Court has a greater impact on the presidency during an election cycle 
rather than off years.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
MODEL 2: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS PUBLIC OPINION DATA, TESTING METHODS 
AND RESULTS 
 
Chapter 5 functions as the second section concerning data, testing methods and 
results for the research question regarding highly salient U.S. Supreme Court cases and 
the presidency. This particular chapter will focus solely on Model 2 which emphasizes 
the relationship between the U.S. Supreme Court and presidential elections. Within this 
interval, I hope to analyze the Court’s impact on how a presidential candidate is viewed 
by public opinion. Does a liberal candidate receive a bump in approval when the Court 
rules in a conservative manner or vice versa? The proxy utilized in Model 2 to evaluate 
the U.S. Supreme Court and presidential elections will be public opinion polls concerned 
with which presidential candidate the poll participant prefers. In this model, American 
citizens will be allocating their support behind a particular candidate rather than the 
current president in office as seen in the previous chapter. The following pages will 
pursue this question by first describing the data pertinent to Model 2. While there may be 
some overlap in data description from the previous chapter, I will mainly focus on data 
that I have yet to fully describe. Secondly, an account of the testing methods utilized will 
explain the continued use of a quasi-experimental design paired with regression analysis.
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Lastly, I will evaluate the results of the models and describe its potential implications on 
the field of political science and judicial politics.  
Data: 
 Model 2 evaluates the effect high profile U.S. Supreme Court decisions have on 
how voters evaluate presidential candidates running for political office from 2004-20012. 
For the sake of the model, this chapter is evaluating this relationship during the 
presidential elections between: John Kerry (D) v. George W. Bush (R) in 2004, Barack 
Obama (D) v. John McCain (R) in 2008, and Barack Obama (D) v. Mitt Romney (R) in 
2012. Due to data and time limitations associated with preforming a thesis, I am only able 
to go back to the Kerry and Bush election. While this creates a limited sample size of 
only 33 cases, which could potentially impact the quality of the regression analysis or 
hinder the chances of findings significance in the models, there are potential benefits of 
this limitation. For example, limiting the data to the 2004-2012 time periods allows us to 
further pursue the political effects of party polarization. While Model 1 in Chapter 4 
failed to find any significant results concerning the impact of polarization of the Court’s 
influence, this limited dataset allows us to easily continue that pursuit. Are salient U.S. 
Supreme Court cases capable of altering how citizens view presidential candidates? Or 
are there too many other important political events occurring in the same time period that 
neutralizes the signals sent by the Court? To effectively answer these puzzling questions, 
data concerning which cases are highly salient and those that are not, the ideological 
direction of the decisions decided and other important variables form the U.S. Supreme 
Court Database, and finally I need to acquire a large amount of public opinion poll data 
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concerning presidential elections to create pre and posttests. The next few paragraphs will 
describe the data utilized to fulfill these criteria. 
 As described in the previous chapter; before being able to successful determine 
the relationship between high profile Supreme Court cases and election public opinion, it 
is important to determine which cases can be deemed salient and those that are not. For 
the sake of this study, the New York Times Salience Measure developed by Epstein and 
Segal (2000) will act as the criteria to determine salience. When a U.S. Supreme Court 
case finds it decision described on the front page of the New York Times, I can argue that 
it is indeed a salient case and thus should have a considerable impact on the American 
public. The media acts as the determining factor of what is salient and what is not salient, 
but this serves the purposes of the study nicely because they have an understanding of 
what the public wants to know and what will sell more papers. If a U.S. Supreme Court 
case ends up on the front page of the NYT’s it then should be news worthy enough to 
dominate that news cycle and calculate into the public’s electoral decision making 
process. Given that chapter 4 described this measure in complete detail there is little need 
to rehash what was said. Simply understand that Model 2 also uses data supplied by the 
U.S. Supreme Court Database and that includes the extremely important New York 
Times Salience Measure.  
Public opinion polls during the presidential election cycle will serve as the data 
source for Model 2’s dependent variable. For the sake of the quasi-experimental design 
utilized for Model 2, this study requires a large amount of data that will enable us to 
perform a pre and posttest. Due to the time sensitive nature of the question being asked, 
there needs to be a pre-test poll that ends just prior to the decision date and a posttest poll 
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that begins the day after the decision was rendered. This is data that must be collected at 
the time of the events and thus must be borrowed from other polling houses. Clearly, it is 
not possible to come up with original data for this study given that the appropriate time 
has passed. Another obstacle for this study was that typically singular polling houses such 
as Gallup were not running day to day public opinion tracking polls for the 2004 
presidential election. While these polling houses have recently adopted the day to day 
polling strategy, unfortunately this is not the case throughout the time period of this 
particular study. Therefore, similar to Model 1 in effort to come up with the necessary 
amount of data, I am forced to compile public opinion data for presidential elections from 
multiple polling houses. While this is certainly not an ideal strategy due to the different 
methodological strategies or political biases associated with the various polling houses, 
however this is the best that can be done under the current data limitations. The literature 
contends that as long as the polling question remains consistent across the different 
polling houses the information utilized will be valid (Smith 1987). For the sake of this 
particular study, a polling house’s results were employed if the phrasing of their question 
used this specific language: “If the presidential election was held today and the 
candidates were X of the Democrats and Y of the Republicans for whom would you 
vote?” This multiple polling house approach proved advantageous for it allowed us to 
create over 836 observations enabling the study to include all 33 salient cases during the 
2004, 2008, and 2012 election cycle. Below is a list of the many polling houses employed 
to compile public opinion data during presidential elections for the 2004, 2008, and 2012 
presidential elections: 
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CNN Opinion Research, TIPP Online, Washington Post/ABC News Poll, 
Reuters, Fox News, Democracy Corps, Gallup, CBS News/New York 
Times, and Rasmussen Tracking Polls. 
Questions concerning the validity of the public opinion elections variable would 
be unfounded due to the consistency is in the questioning methods and the language of 
the questioning across polling houses. While this may not the most ideal way to test the 
relationship between the U.S. Supreme Court and presidential approval, this is the most 
feasible way to perform this kind of test, given the data limitations.  
 Once the public opinion elections data was compiled I applied the correct polls to 
the appropriate U.S. Supreme Court case and established which polls were pre-tests and 
which polls were posttests. In order to easily place the pre and posttests into a regression 
analysis I then created a variable describing the degree of change from the pretest public 
opinion data to the posttest public opinion data for both the Republican and Democratic 
candidate. This variable depicting the degree of change from pretest to posttest serves as 
the primary dependent variable for Model 2 (post-test election public opinion polls – pre-
test election public opinion polls). It subtracts the polling value in the post test with the 
polling value of the pre-test to determine the degree of change “created” by the highly 
salient U.S. Supreme Court case. 
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Table 3: Dependent Variable Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Observations Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Democrat 
Rate of 
Change 
33 0.454 3.113 -4 6 
Republican 
Rate of 
Change 
33 -1.090 3.126 -8 8 
 
 Similar to Model 1; Model 2 will utilize many variables that can be found in the 
U.S. Supreme Court database. The previous chapter described the key variables that serve 
a vital role in the testing of the hypotheses to include: (1) Case ID, (2) Civil liberty Cases, 
(3) Decision Direction, (4) Precedent Alteration, (5) Law Unconstitutionality, and (6) 
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court provide us with the majority vote on the bench. All of 
these variables will be employed again for the sake of Model 2. Another variable that is 
unique to Models 2 and 3 is labeled as (7) media perception of the presidential horserace. 
The objective of this variable is to consider the priming effect the media holds over the  
American public, and control for potential biases created from constant horserace 
reporting that informs the public who is “currently winning” the campaign. Mutz (1995) 
examined the effect of media portrayals of public support for candidates on the behavior 
of potential campaign contributions. Using a time series analysis, he found that the horse-
race spin created by the media helped determine the frequency of campaign 
contributions. A mass media portrayal of public opinion directly influences the decisions 
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of others to contribute to a campaign. Thus, if the media is claiming that candidate X is 
winning the election, a Supreme Court decision that either favors or attacks candidate X’s 
policy platform could have a significant effect. Thus for Model 2 and 3 that focus on 
elections I created the horse race variable. This variable calculates the level in which the 
leading candidate is ahead in the polls along with the number of polls suggesting that 
candidate is winning. These two characteristics are thus complied and determine the way 
citizens are primed by the media. This is a rather imperfect variable in that the polls used 
to assess the media horserace are the same as the polls used in the DV. I understand that 
while this can be problematic, this is the best that could be done under the current 
constraints. In an ideal situation, I would find an index that measures media perception of 
presidential races rather than the using the current variable. Ultimately, we find in the 
results section below that all of this is of little relevance due to the lack of significance 
the variable has on the overall relationship.  
Testing Methods: 
 In effort to test the Model 2 and the Affirmation and Counter-Mobilization 
hypotheses, this study will employ a similar quasi-experimental approach and regression 
analysis to that of Model 1, but it will be ran two separate times to account for changes in 
public opinion toward the Democratic candidate and changes in public opinion for the 
Republican candidate. For the sake of Model 2 the dependent variable will be the degree 
of change from the pretest to posttest in election public opinion surveys. The variables for 
the degree of change for the Democratic candidate and the degree of change for the 
Republican candidate will be ran on different occasions to evaluate the public’s reaction 
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to the U.S. Supreme Court decision being rendered and its ultimate impact on each 
individual candidate.  
With the dependent variable being the degree of change in public opinion data, 
the primary independent variable for Model 2 than will be a dichotomous variable 
determining whether the ideological direction of the U.S. Supreme Court decision aligns 
with the expected ideology of the Democratic or Republican candidate for president. 
Thus, for the sake of the model there are two primary independent variables: (1) 
Decision’s support for the Democratic candidate in the election will determine if the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision supports the expected ideology of the Democratic candidate. For 
the sake of ideology direction, this study adopts the logic utilized in the U.S. Supreme 
Court database concerning what is a liberal decision. I also simply associate a liberal 
decision to be in support of the Democratic candidate running for office. While this 
appears to be a rather simplistic measure of ideology, it is necessary given the makeup of 
the sample being tested. By the public’s assessment of these presidential candidates it is 
most appropriate to use a measure of ideological direction that is simplistic enough for 
average Americans to comprehend or one they are most likely to incorporate. Thus, while 
associating a liberal decision with the liberal leaning Democratic Party may not 
completely represent positions taken by the candidate, it is the best way to measure the 
limited political understanding of everyday citizens. (2) Decision’s support for the 
Republican candidate in the election will determine if the U.S. Supreme Court decision 
supports the expected ideology of the Republican candidate. Both of these two variables 
will be utilized in conjunction with the dependent variable to determine if highly salient 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions impact public opinion during election cycles to create an 
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affirmation or counter-mobilizing effect that alters the way voters view their political 
candidates. Is a high profile decision capable of drawing enough attention to a particular 
subject or issue that it sways the public’s mood and alters a candidate’s chances of 
winning the presidential election? This is a primary question that will be answered in the 
results section that will follow shortly.  
Table 4 below provides a brief description of the four models that will be 
conducted in this chapter concerning public opinion and presidential elections. The table 
below describes four potential scenarios in which the U.S. Supreme Court decision could 
impact the presidential election and thus must be modeled: (1) The impact on the 
Democratic candidate for the presidency when U.S. Supreme Court decides a highly 
salient case that supports the ideological disposition of the Democratic candidate. (2) The 
impact on the Democratic candidate for the presidency when the U.S. Supreme Court 
decides a highly salient case that supports the ideological disposition of the Republican 
candidate. (3) The impact on the Republican candidate for the presidency when the U.S. 
Supreme Court decides a highly salient case that supports the ideological disposition of 
the Republican candidate. Lastly, (4) the impact on the Republican candidates for the 
presidency when the U.S. Supreme Court decides a highly salient case that supports the 
ideological disposition of the Democratic candidate. All four of these scenarios are 
equally likely to occur and thus must be measured.  
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Table 4: Model 2 Methodology 
What is the Model 
Measuring?  
Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variable Controls 
U.S. Supreme Court case’s 
impact on the Democratic 
presidential candidate’s 
public opinion ratings when 
the ideological direction of 
the decision supports the 
Democrat. 
Democratic 
Candidate’s 
Degree of Change   
Decision’s Support for 
Democratic Candidate 
Precedent Alteration 
Unconstitutionality 
Majority vote 
Minority Vote 
Media Horserace 
Civil Liberty Cases 
U.S. Supreme Court case’s 
impact on the Democratic 
presidential candidate’s 
public opinion ratings when 
the ideological direction of 
the decision supports the 
Republican. 
Democratic 
Candidate’s 
Degree of Change   
Decision’s Support for 
Republican Candidate 
Same as above 
 U.S. Supreme Court case’s 
impact on the Republican 
presidential candidate’s 
public opinion ratings when 
the ideological direction of 
the decision supports the 
Republican 
 
Republican 
Candidate’s 
Degree of Change   
Decision’s Support for 
Republican Candidate 
Same as above 
U.S. Supreme Court case’s 
impact on the Republican 
presidential candidate’s 
public opinion ratings when 
the ideological direction of 
the decision supports the 
Democrat. 
 
Republican 
Candidate’s 
Degree of Change   
Decision’s Support for 
Democratic Candidate 
Same as above 
  
Before moving into the result section of the chapter, and revealing the findings 
from the regression analysis, it would be useful to reiterate the hypotheses and general 
expectations that motivate Model 2. Below is the list of applicable hypotheses that apply 
only to Model 2: 
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Affirmation Effect Hypothesis: High salient U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions will have an Affirmation Effect in which the subset of the 
population that ideologically aligns with the decision rendered will 
increase their support for the candidate or president who also 
ideologically aligns with the decision through increases in presidential 
approval ratings, public opinion surveys or campaign donations. 
Counter-Mobilization Hypothesis: High salient U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions will have a Counter-Mobilization Effect, in which the subset of 
the population that does not ideologically align with the decision rendered 
will increase their support for the president or presidential candidate who 
also does not align ideologically with the decision. 
Results:  
 Given the hypotheses described above and the general argument that U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions should have either a positive (affirmation) or negative (counter-
mobilization) effect on public opinion data during presidential election cycles; this 
section seeks to finally confirm or deny these expectations by executing the appropriate 
tests. Using the data and testing methods depicted above, I find no support for the 
hypotheses within Model 2. Below is a description of the results for each of the primary 
hypotheses for Model 2 along with the implications of these findings.  As described in the 
testing method section above the results section will precede in a somewhat similar 
fashion as in Table 4 analyzing (1) the impact on the Democratic candidate for the 
presidency when U.S. Supreme Court decides a highly salient case that supports the 
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ideological disposition of the Democratic candidate. (2) The impact on the Republican 
candidate for the presidency when the U.S. Supreme Court decides a highly salient case 
that supports the ideological disposition of the Republican candidate. Unlike the way the 
models were setup in the testing methods section, I found that there would be little need 
to run the models through both scenarios given the dichotomous nature of the decision 
support variables. Running them with the opposite level of support simply changed the 
direction of the influence but had no effect on the significance of the influence. Therefore 
in the tables below there are simply two regression tables; one for the Democratic 
candidate and the influence of the U.S. Supreme Court and the other for the Republican 
candidate and the influence of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Table 5A: Multivariate Regression Analysis: Democratic Candidate  
Variable Coefficient Standard 
Error 
T P Value 
Decision’s Support for 
Democratic Candidate 
0.376 1.277 0.30 0.77 
Precedent Alteration Omitted due to 
collinearity 
   
Unconstitutionality -0.753 0.689 -1.09 0.28 
Majority Vote -1.548 2.156 -0.72 0.48 
Minority Vote -1.181 2.052 -0.58 0.57 
Civil Liberty Cases -1.850 1.521 -1.22 0.22 
Media Horserace 0.713 0.947 0.75 0.46 
Notes: **p < .05  N= 33 
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Table 5B: Multivariate Regression Analysis: Republican Candidate  
Variable Coefficient Standard Error T P Value 
Decision’s Support for 
Democratic Candidate 
-1.35 1.288 -1.05 0.30 
Precedent Alteration Omitted    
Unconstitutionality -0.015 0.695 -0.02 0.98 
Majority Vote -0.446 2.175 -0.21 0.84 
Minority Vote -1.141 2.070 -0.55 0.58 
Civil Liberty Cases -0.422 1.534 -0.28 0.78 
Media Horserace -0.901 0.955 -0.94 0.34 
Notes: **p < .05  N= 33 
Both Table 5A depicting the relationship between Democratic presidential 
candidate’s election opinion polls and highly salient U.S. Supreme Court cases and Table 
5B depicting the same relationship for Republican presidential candidates fail to find any 
significant relationship between fluctuations in the opinion polls and highly salient U.S. 
Supreme Court cases. The closest these two models come to finding a relationship would 
be the simple decision support for the Republican candidate, but that is only at a 70% 
confidence level, which is nowhere near the necessary 95% threshold to claim a 
significant relationship. One point to note about the two models is the precedent 
alteration variable. Due to collinearity issues the Precedent alteration was omitted. 
Basically in the 33 salient cases that fit into the time frame of the models there were not 
enough precedent altering cases that would enable us to use it as a control.  
The unsuccessful results for Model 2 portrayed above show no support for either 
an Affirmation or Counter-Mobilization effect during presidential election public opinion 
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polls. It is still too early however, to reject our primary general hypotheses concerning the 
Affirmation and Counter-Mobilization effect given that there is still one more model to 
run. While the results of Model 2 are discouraging, they are not too surprising given the 
type of data used in Model 2 (opinion polls) and the overall insignificant findings from 
the previous chapter and Model 1. While presidential approval ratings and public opinion 
polls during the presidential election cycle are different measures, they are still both 
survey polling. As alluded to many times throughout this study, these broad surveys are 
subjected to many other catalysts that lead to fluctuation in the polls and suffer from a 
reactive nature that could limit its application to measuring the Court’s influence on the 
presidency. It is not possible to control for the various factors that lead a citizen to answer 
survey questions in the manner they do. While I hoped to control for this by using a 
quasi-experimental method that reduced the amount of time between the poll and the 
actual Supreme Court decision, it was not always possible to find a poll conducted the 
day before as the pre-test and the day after as the post test. This data issue enabled other 
important political events to play into the fluctuation in the polls. Thus, the overall point 
being made here is that using public opinion polls to assess the Supreme Court’s 
influence is an imperfect measure, and therefore the results from Models 1 and 2 should 
not be viewed as conclusive results. Therefore, I would argue that there needs to be a far 
more exact way of measuring the public’s reaction to U.S. Supreme Court cases that 
public opinion is unable to provide.   
 Chapter 6 seeks to remedy this issue by looking at the influence highly salient 
U.S. Supreme Court cases have on campaign donations. Given that public opinion polls 
during the election cycle appear to be diluted by the many other salient political events 
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that occur in junction with the salient Supreme Court decisions, I argue that this study 
needs to utilize the most tangible data possible. The logic utilized in Chapter 6 argues that 
the most effective way for a voter to affect the campaign process is through campaign 
donations. Therefore, if evidence to support either the Affirmation or the Counter-
Mobilization effect exists, I am most likely to witness this effect while using day to day 
campaign donation data.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
 
MODEL 3: PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN DONATIONS DATA, TESTING 
METHODS AND RESULTS 
 
As the final medium to test the relationship between highly salient Supreme Court 
decisions and the American voter’s evaluation of the presidency; Chapter 6 and Model 3 
analyze day to day campaign donation trends to determine if court decisions are capable 
of eliciting an Affirmation or Counter-Mobilization effect. Similar to the design of the 
previous two chapters, Chapter 6 focuses solely on the data, testing methods and results 
for Model 3. In the previous chapters, I was unable to find any significant relationship 
between the U.S. Supreme Court decision and the presidency through presidential 
approval ratings and during the election cycle. I argue that this lack of relationship can be 
explained by the multitude of competing campaign events, and political information 
available to the citizen participating in the public opinion poll that dilutes the influence of 
the Supreme Court decision. Due to data limitations, it was not always possible to have a 
public opinion poll match up with the day before the U.S. Supreme Court case or the day 
after to create a 100% accurate pre and post-test. Model 3 however, remedies this issue 
because it focuses on an extremely tangible means of political participation for American 
voters and the day-to-day tracking allows for exact pre and post-test execution. Due to
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these remedies, I argue that campaign donation data during the election cycle will provide 
significant proof that U.S. Supreme Court decisions in highly salient situations influence 
American voters to donate to the candidate in which they ideologically align.  
The rationale behind Model 3 is one of personal experience. In the aftermath of 
the Supreme Court decision for the Affordable Health Care Case, I was extremely excited 
and wanted to express my personal approval of the decision. The U.S. Supreme Court 
had just stated the constitutionality of a cornerstone piece of the Obama Administration’s 
policy agenda and I thus decided to donate funds to that particular campaign. In this 
personal example, it can be argued that an affirmation effect occurred. Of course the 
opposite is equally and most likely given the mounds of literature suggesting that a 
counter-mobilization effect is possible. In this same scenario, there can be a conservative 
voter who ideologically disagrees with the U.S. Supreme Court ruling on the Affordable 
Health Care Act and feels that it’s an attack on their basic beliefs. As a result of this 
decision, they should be extremely motivated to be proactive and protect their personal 
beliefs through political participation. I’d argue that a particularly simple way to 
proactively participate in the protection of one’s beliefs would be to provide a campaign 
contribution to the candidate who also disagrees with the decision. The best way to 
overturn this decision or voice one’s disapproval would be to help the other candidate 
win. Model 3 and campaign contributions are most likely to exhibit these two potential 
hypotheses given that they are far more proactive than being randomly selected to 
participate in a public opinion poll and that they also provide one the opportunity to make 
a snap decision and provide a donation. There is no need to wait for a phone call from a 
random survey when you simply need to go to the candidate’s website and enter a credit 
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card number. Citizens are even prompted through random emails from interest groups or 
presidential candidates they support asking them to donate money to their campaign of 
choice. Due to this, I contend that this Model 3 is the most realistic chance to witness 
either the affirmation or the counter-mobilization effect.  
The following pages will first explain the data utilized in this particular model. 
Again, there will be some overlap from previous chapters in regard to U.S. Supreme 
Court data; therefore I will spend the majority of the time explaining only data that has 
yet to be discussed. Secondly, I will describe the testing methods utilized. Due to the 
limited number of observations and data limitations, conducting a regression analysis 
would be inappropriate. Therefore instead, Model 3 takes a qualitative approach 
interrupted time series approach and simply analyzes the time-series in a more 
explanatory/observational fashion that looks for trends in the data. Lastly, the results 
section describes the conclusions drawn from the qualitative time-series analysis and 
explains the general implications of the findings.  
Data: 
 Model 3 attempts to evaluate the Court’s impact on presidential elections and 
campaigns similar to that of Model 2, but measures the phenomenon through a 
completely different medium. Rather than using public opinion polls and surveys to 
determine the influence of the courts, Model 3 seeks to analyze one of the more tangible 
manners in which a motivated American citizen can participate in politics.  
 The primary question to be asked for Model 3 is: Do highly salient U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions have an impact on campaign donations during presidential election 
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cycles? To answer this particular question effectively, I will need to use (1) the New 
York Times Case Salience data to determine which cases are highly salient and those that 
are not. (2) Data from the U.S. Supreme Court Database to utilize variables such as the 
direction of the decision. Lastly, (3) day to day tracking of campaign donations for both 
candidates running for the presidency. Given that the New York Times Case Salience 
measure has been discussed in great lengths already along with the U.S. Supreme Court 
Database variables, there is little need to reiterate their purpose. The following chapter 
will explain the data concerning campaign donations and how it is utilized. 
 Day to day tracking of campaign donations is a relatively new practice in 
campaign monitoring practices. While the Federal Elections Commission has indeed been 
tracking campaign finance information since its inception in 1975, it does not have an 
index that measures donations on a daily basis. The lowest their website appears to break 
this financial information down is on the quarterly or monthly level. Given that I want to 
create a measurement with a pre-test that accounts for the amount of donations coming 
into the campaign the day before U.S. Supreme Court decision and a post-test accounting 
for the amount raised after the U.S. Supreme Court decision to create a variable 
determining the exact rate of change created by the case; I need daily data. Therefore, this 
study turns its attention to OpenSecrets.org and the Center for Responsive Politics who 
have created an index that accounts for day by day comparisons during the 2008 and 
2012 presidential elections.  
While this serves the studies purposes perfectly in that it creates day to day 
tracking of campaign donations, the fact that its only for the 2008 and 2012 election 
limits the number of cases that apply to this particular study. The total number of salient 
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cases that apply to the necessary time period is limited to 14. While this certainly is not 
enough to run an effective regression analysis, it is enough to qualitatively analyze the 
trends associated with influxes and declines in donations. There is enough information 
here to at the very least suggest potential support for our hypotheses, and encourage later 
work analyzing the Court’s impact on the presidency. Regardless of the number of cases, 
positive results would indicate that there is something to this theory; justifying further 
research once more data becomes available. One must remember that a primary goal of 
this study is simply to reset the agenda and bring attention to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
ability to influence presidential politics. Model 3 is still more than capable of serving 
those important purposes. 
The day to day tracking information gathered from the Center for Responsive 
Politics will utilized in a similar fashion as the presidential approval and public opinion 
data from previous models, however with a slight twist. Similar to the previous models, I 
compiled the data and allocated the appropriate dates with the appropriate salient cases to 
create pre and post-tests. From here I established a rate of change variable rather than a 
degree of change variable as seen in previous models. By subtracting the post-test 
donations from the pre-test donations and dividing that by the pre-test donation, I am able 
to establish the percentage of change that occurs after the U.S. Supreme Court renders its 
decision (post-test – pre-test / pre-test = rate of change in campaign donations). It is from 
this particular variable paired with the direction of the decision and the expected 
ideological direction of the candidate running for office that will be utilized to determine 
the ultimate effect of the Court on the presidency during election cycles. 
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Testing Methods: 
 As alluded to earlier, in order to appropriately test Model 3 and the hypotheses 
associated with it; this study will not employ the regression analysis scheme used in the 
previous two chapters. Instead, Model 3 will emphasize the interrupted time series 
approach and preform a more qualitative case study analysis based around the rate of 
change variables to determine if there is any indication that an Affirmation or Counter-
Mobilization effect is occurring.  
 For the sake of the results section in Model 3, the 14 salient cases that pertain to 
the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections will be categorized into three separate sections 
based on the level of rate of change from the pre to post-tests in campaign contributions: 
Category 1: No Hypothesized Influence 
 All U.S. Supreme Court cases that fail to exhibit any behavior 
consistent with the hypothesized Affirmation or Counter-Mobilization 
effect will be placed into category 1. If there is truly no relationship 
between highly salient U.S. Supreme Court decisions and campaign 
donations in presidential elections, I should see the majority of Supreme 
Court cases fall into this category. An example of the numerical values 
that would lead a U.S. Supreme Court case to be categorized in this 
manner would be: Rate of Change in Democratic Campaign Donations = -
5% and Rate of Change in Republican Campaign Donations = -21% for a 
case with a liberal decision. Under this example there is no substantial 
evidence where liberal supporters increase support of their candidate and 
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there is no support for a counter-mobilization effect amongst conservative 
voters. While this is a hypothetical example, it shows that neither the 
Republican candidate nor the Democratic Candidate received any 
hypothesized reaction from the Supreme Court case. 
Category 2: Minor Influence 
 All U.S. Supreme Court cases that exhibit behavior consistent with 
either the Affirmation or the Counter-Mobilization effect, but show a rate 
of change below 100% are placed into Category 2. In this particular 
instance, the U.S. Supreme Court appears to have had an impact on the 
presidential candidate’s campaign donations in question, but the rate of 
change is only slightly changed. Given that this is a qualitative study and 
relies on observations and judgment of the author in question, I want to 
temper the interpreted implications of any limited results. While it may be 
a little extreme to imply that a 100% increase in funding is only minor, I 
hold this high level to exhibit the validity of this model’s study. U.S. 
Supreme Court cases that are placed into Category 2 can be used to argue 
for the validity of the hypotheses; however the overall implications of 
these findings should be viewed cautiously. 
Category 3: Major Influence 
 All U.S. Supreme Court cases that exhibit behavior consistent with 
either the Affirmation or the Counter-Mobilization effect and show a rate 
of change that is above 100% are placed into Category 3. Cases that fall 
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into Category 3 show massive fluctuations in campaign donations after a 
U.S. Supreme Court decision is rendered and provide excellent support for 
either the Affirmation or the Counter-Mobilization hypotheses. If the 
majority of U.S. Supreme Court decisions fall into Category 3, it would be 
a very positive sign toward the validity of the hypotheses put forth in this 
study. 
 One final important question that remains unanswered is how exactly one would 
determine if there is evidence of Affirmation in Counter-Mobilization using the rate of 
change variable? In conjunction with the decision’s support of either the liberal or 
conservative candidate based on the ideological direction of the decision I can determine 
the effect based on the direction of the increase of decrease in donations. For example, 
there is a hypothetical U.S. Supreme Court decision that supports the liberal candidate 
and as a result of this there is a positive increase in Democratic campaign contributions of 
+57%. This would be categorized as a minor influence for the Court and would signify 
potential Affirmation effects. In this case the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the 
Democratic candidate and as a result the next day there was a spike in funding for that 
same candidate. On the opposite end of the hypothesized spectrum there is the Counter-
Mobilization effect which can be exemplified when a U.S. Supreme Court decision that 
supports a liberal candidate and as a result we see a positive increase of +150% in 
campaign donations for the Republican candidate. In this case the U.S. Supreme Court 
disagreed with the conservative ideology, but there still is evidence of a spike in 
donations. Given that negative reactions to court decisions tend to elicit greater reaction 
than positive ones (Grosskopf and Mondak 1998), the Counter-Mobilization effect 
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illustrates the public’s fear of policy that they ideologically disagree with. To counteract 
this problem, citizens donate to the candidate who would most likely also disagree with 
the decision and potentially remedy the problem.  
 Before moving on to the results section for Model 3, and revealing the findings 
from our qualitative analysis, it would be useful to reiterate the hypotheses and general 
expectations that motivate Model 3. Below is the list of applicable hypotheses that apply 
to Model 3: 
Affirmation Effect Hypothesis: High salient U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions will have an Affirmation Effect in which the subset of the 
population that ideologically aligns with the decision rendered will 
increase their support for the candidate or president who also 
ideologically aligns with the decision through increases in presidential 
approval ratings, public opinion surveys or campaign donations. 
Counter-Mobilization Hypothesis: High salient U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions will have a Counter-Mobilization Effect, in which the subset of 
the population that does not ideologically align with the decision rendered 
will increase their support for the president or presidential candidate who 
also does not align ideologically with the decision. 
Results 
 Given the hypotheses above and the general argument that U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions should influence campaign donations during presidential election cycles; this 
section executes the qualitative time series analysis related to the rate of change in day to 
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day campaign donations. Using the data and testing methods depicted above, Model 3 
finds strong support for the Counter-Mobilization effect. As for the Affirmation effect, 
there are signs to suggest that this effect also occurs, but it is less convincing than the 
information in favor of the Counter-Mobilization effect.  
Of the 14 salient U.S. Supreme Court cases that occur during the 2008 and 2012 
presidential campaign process, 7 cases showed “Major” change in campaign donations 
the day after the U.S. Supreme Court decision dominated the news cycle on the front 
page of the New York Times. There were also 6 other cases that showed “Minor” change 
in campaign contributions, but still suggested behavior consistent with either the 
Affirmation or Counter-Mobilization effect. Only 2 out of the 14 cases measured in this 
model suggest that the U.S. Supreme Court has little to no influence on the campaign 
donation process. Below in Table 6A is a comprehensive look at these results, depicting 
the rate of change for each presidential candidate and the hypothesis that the results 
suggest, while 6B and 6C provide a closer look at the impact these cases have on each 
partisan affiliation. 
Table 6A: U.S. Supreme Court Decision’s Impact on Presidential Campaign 
Donations 
Case 
ID 
Case 
Name 
Liberal 
Decision 
Conservative 
Decision 
Rate of 
Change in 
Democratic 
Campaign 
Donations 
Effect Rate of 
Change in 
Republican 
Campaign 
Donations 
Effect 
2007-
017 
 
Riegel v. 
Medtronic
, Inc. 
Yes No 0% Neither +582% Counter 
2007-
031 
 
Bowling v. 
Kentucky 
Departme
nt of 
Correction 
No Yes -71% Counter -76% Neither 
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2007-
042 
 
CBOCS 
West, Inc. 
v. 
Humphrie
s 
Yes No +208% Affirma
tion 
∞% 
*due to pre-
test=0 
(actually saw 
an increase of 
$531,500) 
Counter 
2007-
043 
 
Gomez-
Perez v. 
Potter 
Yes No +208% Affirma
tion 
∞% 
*due to pre-
test=0 
(actually saw 
an increase of 
$531,500) 
Counter 
2007-
053 
 
Boumedie
ne v. Bush 
 
Yes No +29% Affirma
tion 
+135% Counter 
2007-
068 
 
 
Kennedy 
v. 
Louisiana 
 
Yes No -36% Neither +12% Counter 
2007-
071 
 
District of 
Columbia 
v. Heller 
 
No Yes +40% Counter -29% Neither  
2011-
021 
 
Perry v. 
Perez 
 
No Yes +13% Counter -33% Neither 
2011-
038 
 
Lafler v. 
Cooper 
 
Yes No -19% Neither -67% Neither 
2011-
039 
 
Missouri 
v. Frye 
 
Yes No -19% Neither -67% Neither 
2011-
072 
 
FCC v. 
Fox 
Television 
Stations 
 
Yes No -56% Neither +89% Counter 
2011-
074 
 
Miller v. 
Alabama 
 
Yes No -36% Neither  +1942% Counter 
2011-
075 
 
Arizona v. 
United 
States 
 
Yes No -36% Neither +1942% Counter 
2011-
077 
 
The 
Affordable 
Health 
Care 
Cases 
 
Yes No -39% Neither +284% Counter 
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Table 6B: Liberal Population’s Response to U.S. Supreme Court Decision 
Neither Affirmation Effect Counter-Mobilization 
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries Bowling v. Kentucky Department 
of Correction 
Kennedy v. Louisiana Gomez-Perez v. Potter District of Columbia v. Heller 
Lafler v. Cooper 
 
Boumediene v. Bush Perry v. Perez 
Missouri v. Frye 
 
  
FCC v. Fox Television Stations 
 
  
Miller v. Alabama 
 
  
Arizona v. United States 
 
  
The Affordable Health Care 
Cases 
 
  
 
Table 6C: Conservative Population’s Response to U.S. Supreme Court Decisions 
Neither Affirmation Effect Counter-Mobilization 
Bowling v. Kentucky 
Department of Correction 
 Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. 
District of Columbia v. Heller 
 
 CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries 
Perry v. Perez 
 
 Gomez-Perez v. Potter 
Lafler v. Cooper 
 
 Boumediene v. Bush 
 
Missouri v. Frye 
 
 Kennedy v. Louisiana 
 
  FCC v. Fox Television Stations 
 
  Miller v. Alabama 
 
  Arizona v. United States 
 
  The Affordable Health Care Cases 
 
 
 Within Table 6A, 6B and 6C there are some simple trends that occur throughout 
the 14 cases of study: 
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(1) Find significant support for the hypotheses that were unfounded in the 
previous 2 models concerning public opinion polls. This could suggest that 
campaign donations are the most appropriate proxy to measure the impact on U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions on presidential elections or presidential evaluation. In 
12 out of 14 cases, I find a significant relationship between the decision and the 
immediate response by the public. In these 12 cases, the public appears to be more 
inclined to donate to their candidate of choice either out of Affirmation of the 
court’s ideological disposition onto their own or through Counter-Mobilization 
out of fear of their ideological beliefs being ignored. 
 (2) The Counter-Mobilization effect is far more prominent than the Affirmation 
effect. Evidence of Counter-Mobilization occurs 12 times whereas evidence for 
the Affirmation effect only occurs 3 times. This is fairly consistent with the 
literature that suggests a negative approval of a U.S. Supreme Court decision is 
more likely to elicit a reaction from the public than actual approval.  
(3) The Counter-Mobilization effect appears to be more prevalent among 
conservative citizens than those of liberal ideological disposition. While this 
could be a case of data bias given that the majority of the decisions rendered by 
the Court in this sample are liberal decisions, the conservative ideology appears to 
be more likely to act in a Counter-Mobilizing fashion.  9 out of the 11 times 
Counter-Mobilization occurs it is when the court submits a liberal decision. This 
could suggest that the traditional nature associated with the conservative ideology 
is more likely to mobilize in support of their candidate when they feel their 
ideological beliefs are being threatened.  
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(4) Citizens who align with a liberal ideological disposition are more difficult to 
categorize than those of the conservative ideology. While conservatives 
demonstrate a pattern of Counter-Mobilization with no tendency toward the 
Affirmation effect, liberals appear to not prefer any strategy. This is evident in 
that there are 3 cases showing an Affirmation effect, 3 cases showing a Counter-
Mobilization effect. This lack of predictable pattern among liberal citizens may be 
due to the subset of cases being heavily in favor of the liberal ideology, creating 
little opportunity to Counter-Mobilize, however at this point it remains unclear.  
(5) It is possible to have U.S. Supreme Court decisions that foster many different 
reactions from the public. In 3 cases we witness public reaction that fulfills both 
the Affirmation and Counter-Mobilization hypothesis at the same time. However 
in the majority of cases (9), the Supreme Court submits a decision and is receives 
a response from the public that supports the Counter-Mobilization hypothesis. An 
interesting side project to conduct based off of these findings would seek to 
determine the conditions that foster cases that promote both affirmation and 
counter-mobilization compared to cases that foster simply counter-mobilization.  
 While these general trends are certainly interesting and Table 6A provides 
evidence that there indeed is a relationship here, is this information exhibiting true 
fluctuations in campaign donations? Or are they these changes merely insignificant in 
measure? While these cases may be exhibiting evidence of these two potential 
explanations, are they just barley showing these effects? Table 6D below, utilizes the 
categorization strategy described earlier in the testing method section above Ultimately, 
any U.S. Supreme Court cases that falls into Category 1 would negate the general 
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hypotheses whereas Category 2 and 3 would provide support for them. The study places 
higher weight on those that fall into Category 3 over Category 2 due to the relative 
amount of change that occurs in the level of campaign donations. While both Category 2 
and 3 exhibit significant changes, those in Category 3 which fall above the 100% 
threshold should be far more persuasive. 
Table 6D: Categorization of U.S. Supreme Court Decision’s Influence on Campaign 
Donations 
Category 1: No 
Hypothesized Influence 
Category 2: Minor 
Influence 
Category 3: Major 
Influence 
Lafler v. Cooper 
 
Bowling v. Kentucky Department 
of Correction 
 
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. 
Missouri v. Frye 
 
Kennedy v. Louisiana 
 
CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries 
(Affirmation and Counter) 
 District of Columbia v. Heller 
 
Gomez-Perez v. Potter 
(Affirmation and Counter) 
 Perry v. Perez 
 
Boumediene v. Bush (Counter) 
 
 FCC v. Fox Television Stations 
 
Miller v. Alabama 
 
 Boumediene v. Bush 
(Affirmation) 
Arizona v. United States 
 
  The Affordable Health Care 
Cases 
 
Notes: No influence: No hypothesized relationship found, Minor Influence: Hypothesized 
relationship found but rate of change below 100%, Major Influence: Hypothesized 
relationship found with rate of change above 100% 
 Table 6D shows that only 2 U.S. Supreme Court cases fall under “No influence”, 
5 fall under only ”Minor influence”, whereas there are 7 cases that fall under “Major 
influence”. From this particular table I find that there 13 different scenarios where a U.S. 
Supreme Court decision is rendered placed on the front page of the New York Times 
(thus becoming a salient issue) and the very next day see fluctuations in campaign 
donations. In the majority of these cases there are massive fluctuations that are over 
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100% increases. While this is a limited sample, these numbers strongly suggest that there 
is validity to the theory that the Courts have an impact on presidential campaign 
donations.   
 In Category 3, we see U.S. Supreme Court cases that are associated with very 
controversial political topics that lead to a strong reaction from the American populace. 
For example, The Affordable Health Care cases clearly were one of the more polarizing 
political topics during the 2012 presidential elections. Liberal leaning citizens who 
supported the Democratic candidate Barack Obama tended to support the affirmation of 
the Affordable Health Care act whereas conservative leaning citizens who supported 
Republican candidate Mitt Romney sought to see the act repealed.  On June 28
th
 2012, 
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Affordable Care Act was indeed constitutional 
confirming the policy agenda of the liberal leaning Barack Obama. On that same day 
there is a 284% increase in campaign donations to the Romney campaign. This can be 
interpreted as strong evidence that the U.S. Supreme Court decision had an impact on the 
American voters who do not align ideologically with the court’s ruling, and evidence in 
favor of the Counter-Mobilization hypothesis. People who disagreed with the Court felt 
compelled to donate their hard earned money to the Romney campaign in hope to 
overturn the decision.  
 While I have used the Affordable Health Act many times throughout the paper to 
exemplify the influence of the U.S. Supreme Court and in this case the Counter-
Mobilization effect, there are several other controversial Supreme Court decisions that 
portray similar patterns of behavior. Arizona v. United States (2012) ruled on the 
constitutionality of the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act 
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passed by the state of Arizona which challenged the federal government’s authority to 
regulate immigration laws and enforcement. (Oyez 2013). Similar to health care, the 
issue of immigration was also a politically salient issue during the 2012 presidential 
election and as a result depicts even greater spikes in campaign donations the day after 
the decision. Table 6A shows that the liberal decision rendered by the Court that limited 
the state of Arizona’s ability to supersede federal policy elicited a spike in contributions 
to the Romney campaign of over 1942%. Again, this donation spike for a Republican 
candidate after a liberal decision clearly depicts Counter-Mobilization behavior.  
 Boumediene v. Bush (2008) is another U.S. Supreme Court decision that had a 
Counter-Mobilizing effect after a liberal decision. Boumediene v. Bush (2008) dealt with 
the denial of writ of habeas corpus for Guantanamo detainees. The plea was submitted by 
Lakhdar Boumediene, a naturalized citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina who was being 
held in military detention at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. The court decided in a 5-4 
majority, holding that prisoners had a right to habeas corpus under the U.S. Constitution 
and the Military Commissions Act of 2006 was an unconstitutional suspension of that 
right. During the 2008 presidential election, a major campaigning issue was the rights of 
the accused and the validity of Guantanamo Bay Prison (Oyez 2013). President Obama 
directly campaigned on the idea of closing down the prison and moving those detained to 
another detention center. Once the Court’s decision was laid out there was a 135% spike 
in fundraising for the McCain campaign exhibiting potential Counter Mobilization. 
Again, here is another controversial politically relevant topic determined in the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the media covers the case at length, and then there is a spike in donations 
for a particular candidate. This should serve as convincing evidence that the Court in this 
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particular instance has some influence on the U.S. public and the presidential campaign 
process. 
 While it is certainly possible to go into detail describing each of the cases above, 
its characteristics and how it was politically relevant to prove the validity of the Counter-
Mobilization hypothesis, I would contend that these three examples above and the 
information in the tables throughout the chapter make the relationship very clear. Model 
3 finds substantial evidence supporting the Counter-Mobilization Hypothesis which 
argues that salient U.S. Supreme Court decisions during presidential election cycles tend 
to have a Counter-Mobilizing effect on the American citizens who ideologically disagree 
with the decision.  
There is less evidence to support the notion that U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
lead to an affirmation effect. While some cases exhibit this behavior, there is less 
convincing proof to support the Affirmation Hypothesis. Therefore, I am in no way 
rejecting the concept that the Affirmation Effect Hypothesis is possible, I simply do not 
find enough support in the literature or in this model to conclusively uphold the 
hypothesis. I would argue however, that given the trends we see in the tables above with 
more data it is possible to see further proof for the Affirmation effect.  
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Table 6E: Hypothesis Results 
Hypothesis Model 3 Support? 
Hypothesis 1: Highly salient Supreme Court 
cases will have an Affirmation Effect on 
campaign donations 
Further Research Required 
3 out of the 14 cases provided evidence of the 
Affirmation effect. Need more data to confirm its 
significance. 
Hypothesis 2: Highly salient Supreme Court 
cases will have a Counter-Mobilization effect on 
campaign donations 
Yes 
There appears to be strong support in favor of the 
Counter-Mobilization effect 
 
 While these findings are certainly interesting and provide support for the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s ability to influence other branches of government, it is not possible to 
claim these results are robust. Due to the data limitations that come with using a new 
form of measurement, there are only 14 salient cases in Model 3. While I am able to 
witness trends that support the general hypotheses, it is important to proceed with 
caution. More evidence is needed and further study in regard to this phenomenon is 
necessary.  
The final and potentially most important implication of this study is that given the 
positive findings in Model 3, there should be enough evidence to show that there is a 
need for other political science scholars to focus on the U.S. Supreme Court’s influence 
on other branches of government. The day to day campaign donation data suggests that 
there is validity to the proposed hypotheses and that further evaluation of the overall 
phenomenon should be pursued. It should no longer be acceptable for the field of judicial 
politics to ignore the Court’s ability to impact the election cycle or other potential 
phenomenon. The political science field needs to reset the way it evaluates the indirect 
101 
 
influence of the Court to include its ability to be proactive rather than simply analyzing 
how it reacts to the aggressive electoral branches. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Considering the political ramifications and the magnitude of the media coverage 
associated with the U.S. Supreme Court decision concerning the Affordable Health Care 
Act in the summer of 2012, I was inspired to evaluate the level of influence a single U.S. 
Supreme Court decision can have on the presidential campaign process as well as the 
evaluation of presidential performance in general. Is it possible for a Supreme Court 
decision to alter the way we view a candidate for office or the performance of the 
president? As alluded to in the chapters earlier, this U.S. Supreme Court decision was 
highly visible amongst the media and encouraged potential voters such as myself to 
participate in the campaign process through either affirmation or rejection of our 
ideological beliefs on the issue of health care. Compelled that this was a viable political 
science question, I sought to formulate a research question that would be worthy of the 
judicial politics field. From this single event the basis of the study was formed.  
Throughout this paper I have sought to assess the influence highly salient U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions have on the public’s evaluation of presidential performance. 
Through this research question I sought to determine if a U.S. Supreme Court decision is 
capable of having either an (1) Affirmation Effect or a (2) Counter-Mobilization Effect.
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The Affirmation effect describes the scenario where the U.S. Supreme Court decision 
affirms a set of ideological beliefs and thus motivates those who ideologically align with 
the ruling to engage in support of their candidate most likely to uphold such a ruling. As a 
result, there is an increase in either public opinion ratings or increases in campaign 
donations to the particular presidential candidate that closely aligns with the direction of 
the decision. There is also the Counter-Mobilization effect where high profile Supreme 
Court cases have an adverse effect and create a more negative response motivating the 
opposite party to increase their support of the candidate who does not align with the 
direction of the decisions. This Counter-Mobilizing effect is associated with a rally 
around the flag effect, when one’s ideological beliefs are threatened it can lead to a 
highly motivated reaction that mobilizes behind the presidential candidate that is most 
likely to protect their particular political views. 
Using these two primary effects as the overlapping general hypotheses to base the 
study around, I decided to test the impact highly salient U.S. Supreme Court cases have 
on the evaluation of the presidency using three different proxies: (1) presidential approval 
ratings, (2) public opinion polls during election cycles, and (3) day to day campaign 
donation data.  
Model 1, using presidential approval rating data, sought to test the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s ability to influence the evaluation of the presidency during non-election cycles 
between 1993 and 2012. This model evaluates the relationship between the dependent 
variable of the change in presidential approval ratings from the pre to the post-test (post-
test – pre-test = degree of change) and an independent variable that accounts for the 
ideological support the U.S. Supreme Court decision has for the president in office. To 
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test this relationship, I used bivariate, multivariate and interactive regression analysis 
paired with the quasi-experimental approach. Within Model 1, I find no statistically 
significant evidence supporting the Affirmation or Counter-Mobilization hypotheses. 
This suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court has little to no effect on variations in 
presidential approval ratings.  
Model 2, using public opinion data during presidential election cycles, evaluated 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s ability to influence the viability of individual presidential 
candidates. This model tested weather a highly salient case could increase or decrease the 
chances of a particular presidential candidate being elected to office. Similar to Model 1, 
Model 2 is tested using quantitative analysis through bivariate, multivariate, and 
interactive regressions. Comparable to the results in Model 1, I find no statistically 
significant evidence supporting the Affirmation or Counter-Mobilization hypotheses. 
This suggests that the Courts have little to no influence on fluctuations in presidential 
public opinion polls.  
The lack of significant support for the primary hypotheses for the study thus far, 
were discouraging, but could be more of a reflection of the proxy of study chosen  than 
by the Court’s actual influence on the presidency. With presidential approval ratings and 
election public opinion polls, there are far too many intervening or competing influences 
that limit the influence of the Supreme Court decision. Even if I was to find perfect 
public opinion polling data that matches up with the day before and the day after the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision, it is next to impossible to control for the other reasons an 
American voter would have a positive or negative opinion about a candidate.  
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Model 3 seeking to remedy the downfalls of the previous two models, takes an 
alternative approach and moves away from survey data to instead rely on day to day 
campaign. I argued that donating to a presidential campaign is the most proactive means 
of participation available to an American voter and thus would be an ideal way to 
evaluate the effect high profile Supreme Court cases have on presidential campaigns. If 
you agree with the decision rendered by the Court it can spur you to donate to a 
presidential campaign. On the opposite end of the spectrum, you could ideologically 
disagree with the same Supreme Court decision and thus in effort to protect one’s 
ideological beliefs decide to donate money to the candidate who is most likely to work to 
overturn the decision. Using a rate of change rather than a degree of change measure 
(post-test – pre-test / pre-test) as the dependent variable and the direction of the 
decision’s support for the candidate’s ideology as the independent variable, I conduct a 
qualitative time series analysis to test the hypotheses in question. During the 2008 and 
2012 presidential election cycles, I find strong support for the Counter-Mobilization 
effect but only minor support for the Affirmation effect. This suggests that U.S. Supreme 
Court cases during the 2008 and 2012 presidential election cycle exhibited patterns where 
when American citizens ideologically disagreed with the highly salient decisions 
rendered by the Supreme Court they were most likely to heavily increase their support for 
the presidential candidate who also ideologically disagrees with the decision. As a result 
of this, when this set of circumstances occur, I witness a drastic increase in the 
percentage of campaign donations for the presidential candidate on the “losing” side of 
the debate. Evidence in support of the Counter-Mobilization effect are consistent with 
past political science literature which contend that the American public tends to react 
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strongly to Supreme Court decisions they disagree with but fail to react when there is a 
decision they do indeed agree with (Grosskopf and Mondak 1998). This would explain 
why the findings in favor of the Affirmation effect are relatively tempered. Below I have 
created a list of the general findings from Model 3: 
1. High profile U.S. Supreme Court decisions have a significant impact 
on fluctuation in donations to presidential campaigns. The majority of 
salient Supreme Court cases sees an increase or decrease in donations 
over 100%.  
2. The Counter-Mobilization effect is far more prominent than the 
Affirmation effect. We see its effect in 12 out of the 14 cases whereas 
in only 3 out of the 14 cases for the Affirmation effect 
3. The Counter-Mobilization effect if far more prevalent among 
conservative American voters than liberal Americans.  
4. It is possible for a single U.S. Supreme Court case to foster both an 
Affirmation and Counter-Mobilization effect. This occurred on 3 
separate occasions.  
Now that all of the analysis has been conducted and the results for all of the 
Models have been recorded, how exactly did the overlapping hypotheses which drove 
this study preform throughout the three models? Below in Table 7, is a list of the 
appropriate models matched up with the two primary hypotheses. It is apparent that in 
Models 1 and 2 there is no statistically significant results in favor of either the affirmation 
or the Counter-mobilization effects. However, as mentioned in the paragraph above there 
are promising findings in Model 3 concerning campaign donation data. Within this model 
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there is significant support for the Counter-mobilization effect and some support for the 
Affirmation effect. 
Table 7: Conclusions 
Model Support For Affirmation 
Effect Hypothesis 
Support for Counter-
Mobilization Effect 
Hypothesis 
Model 1: Presidential 
Approval Ratings 
No No 
Model 2: Public Opinion 
during Election Cycles 
No No 
Model 3: Campaign 
Donations 
No (requires further research) Yes 
 
While the results for Model 3 suggest significant support for the Counter-
Mobilization effect, the implications of these findings need to be interpreted in a 
conservative manner. Due to data limitations associated with utilizing a relatively new 
measure of compiling campaign finance data, the study is limited to the 2008 and 2012 
presidential election cycle. This limited time frame only allows me to conduct the 
necessary analysis on 14 salient U.S. Supreme Court cases. While this is certainly enough 
to witness trends or patterns that suggest the prevalence of the Counter-Mobilization 
effect, it should be understood that the positive results I find in Model 3 may not hold 
over a longer time span and requires further research. Therefore, I suggest one exercises 
caution when expanding on the implications of these particular findings.  
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Naturally, this study is but a first step forward into understanding the impact the 
highly salient U.S. Supreme Court cases have on voter’s evaluation of presidential 
candidates or incumbents as well as the Court’s impact on other branches of government 
in general. This study was meant to “reset” the agenda in American judicial politics and 
bring attention to the potential ways the U.S. Supreme Court can alter the behavior of the 
other branches of government. The emphasis on the reactive behavior the Supreme Court 
exhibits toward the other branches of government has been far too prevalent in the 
literature and has left the other side of the relationship completely ignored. I would argue 
that this research project provides judicial politics scholars an excellent starting point to 
further analyze this phenomenon. While the research for this particular project is 
concluding, there are still many potential questions that remain unanswered. For example, 
I would be interested to see a focused research project on the impact party polarization 
has had on the U.S. Supreme Court. What has its impact been on the judicial nomination 
process, how has it effected the Court’s certification process, as well as the Court’s 
tendency to make controversial decisions. While at points in the study there were signs 
that party polarization played into an increasing role for the Courts, overall this study was 
relatively unsuccessful in supporting that claim. However the means used to test this 
phenomenon were limited. Therefore, I would argue that there is room for more research. 
Another potential research avenue available to political science researchers is to further 
develop day to day campaign finance tracking. This is an invaluable asset to those who 
wish to conduct time series analyses. While limited, the data we do have clearly suggests 
that day to day tracking of campaign donations is an excellent medium to measure the 
court’s impact on the presidency during election cycles. It would appear that the 
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proactive nature of donating to a campaign is a far more appropriate medium to capture 
the effects of the Court on the public than public opinion polls. The data simply needs to 
be further developed. Also, extending this kind of research into the other branches of 
government is certainly possible. I would be interested to see a study that investigates the 
impact Supreme Court cases have on issue advocacy. Similar to the use of day to day 
campaign finance in this project one could create pre and post test to determine the 
impact salient and non-salient Supreme Court cases have on fund raising for particular 
issue advocacy. One of the goals an interest group has while arguing before the courts is 
to bring attention to their particular issue advocacy message. Some potential research 
questions could include: Does this translate into increases in funding? Do we see a spike 
or decline in donations to interest groups promoting their agenda at the Supreme Court 
level? Is there an effect similar to the hypothesized Affirmation or Counter-mobilization 
effects? This study would help evaluate the impact the U.S. Supreme Court has on 
interest groups that seek to advance their agendas through the courts. Focusing on interest 
group issue advocacy rather than presidential campaign finance data will solve the 
limited number of case issue because there is not a limited time frame when interest 
groups can appear before the court as well as there being far more interest groups than 
candidates running for office. Also, this study would allow one to evaluate both non-
salient and salient cases, and I would think that these groups have been compiling data 
for a long amount of time. Finally, other more obvious extensions of this project would 
include research regarding Congressional elections, especially when there is a decision 
that pertains directly to the Congressman’s own district. When the U.S. Supreme Court 
case overturns a piece of legislation authored by their congressmen, are voters more 
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likely to vote them out of office? Given the lack of literature in this area, there are 
countless areas of extension that can branch off from this project.  
Overall, I would argue that this research project was a success. While I did not find 
overwhelming conclusive support for both the Affirmation and Counter-Mobilization 
hypotheses as seen through the lack of hypothesized support through presidential 
approval ratings and public opinion polls, there was enough evidence from the analysis 
conducted with day to day campaign finance data to suggest a statistically significant 
result. Given the proactive qualities that enable one to make a campaign donation to 
presidential candidate after a U.S. Supreme Court decision, finding that donations are a 
more effective proxy than public opinion polls is not surprising. The true impact the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision appears to have is one leading to a “snap” decision of validation 
or panic that mobilizes American citizens to rally behind the candidate who they 
ideologically agree with. In the case of campaign donations the medium to participate in 
the political process is readily available and can be done by simply logging on to the 
presidential candidate’s website to donate immediately after the decision is rendered. 
This allows citizens to interject their opinions of the highly salient case without waiting 
to be asked their opinion on the subject as one would have to do to participate in a public 
opinion poll. The desire to speak one’s mind about the Supreme Court decision ultimately 
has an impact on the presidents running for office because it leads to an increase in their 
own or the opponent’s campaign war chests, which can ultimately impact the outcome of 
the election. Public opinion polls on the other hand, we not nearly as successful as the 
campaign donation model, and proved to be less capable of detecting this relationship 
given the less proactive nature of the polling process. With opinion polls, there is no 
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guarantee that a citizen directly affected by the U.S. Supreme Court decision will be 
randomly selected in the poll as well as there being no direct mechanism for a citizen to 
express their opinions directly after understanding the case. The selection issues as well 
as the inability to quickly express their political Affirmation of the decision or Counter-
Mobilize in opposition against a decision makes it difficult for these polls to adequately 
measure the Court’s impact without being muddled by other key political events. These 
overall conclusions are reflected in the findings that support the Counter-Mobilization 
effect through the use of day to day campaign donations while there is little support for 
either of the hypothesized relationships through presidential approval or public opinion 
polls Therefore, given the results of this study there appears to be enough support to 
justify a call for additional research into the Court’s capacity to influence the public or 
other branches of government in effort to further understand the extent of the Affirmation 
and Counter-Mobilization effects.  
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APPENDICES 
 
 
 
Codebook 
1. Case ID (caseid) 
 Case ID serves as the unifying variable in the dataset. Within this variable, 
the first four digits are the term. The next four are the case within the term 
(starting at 001 and counting up). 
2. Issue Area (issueArea) 
 This variable simply separates the issues identified in the preceding 
variable (issue) into the following larger categories: criminal procedure 
(issues 10010-10600), civil rights (issues 20010-20410), First Amendment 
(issues 30010-30020), due process (issues 40010-40070), privacy (issues 
50010-50040), attorneys (issues 60010-60040), unions (issues 70010-
70210), economic activity (issues 80010-80350), judicial power (issues 
90010-90520), federalism (issues 100010-100130), interstate relation 
(issues 110010-110030), federal taxation (issues 120010-120040), 
miscellaneous (issues 130010-130020), and private law (issues 140010-
140080). 
i. Values:
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1. Criminal Procedure 
2. Civil Rights 
3. First Amendments 
4. Due Process 
5. Privacy 
6. Attorneys 
7. Unions 
8. Economic Activity 
9. Judicial Power 
10. Federalism 
11. Interstate Relations 
12. Federal Taxation 
13. Miscellaneous 
14. Private Action 
3. Civil Liberties (civlib) 
 This variable determines if a U.S. Supreme Court case is of the issue of 
civil liberties or not. 
i. Civil liberty case = 1 
ii. Non-civil liberty case = 0 
4. Decision Direction (decisiondirection) 
 Variable determines whether the Court supports or opposes the issue to 
which the case pertains, this variable codes the ideological direction of the 
decision 
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1. Conservative =1 
2. Liberal= 2 
3. Unspecified=3 
5. Decision’s Support of President Subjected to Presidential Approval Rating 
(decision_support_presapproval) 
 Variable measures the ideological support the U.S. Supreme Court 
decision provides the current president in office. Using a basic spectrum of 
political ideology, if the direction of the decision is consistent with the 
expected ideology of the current president the U.S. Supreme Court case 
will receive a 1. If the direction of the decision is the opposite of the 
expected ideology of the current president, the U.S. Supreme Court case 
will receive a 0. 
i. Values: 
1. Case supports president ideology = 1 
2. Case opposes president ideology = 0 
6. Supreme Court decision alters precedent (precedentalteration) 
 Variable measures if the majority opinion effectively says that the decision 
in this case “overruled” one or more of the Court’s own precedents. 
i. Values: 
1. 0= no formal alteration of precedent 
2. 1= precedent formally altered 
7. Supreme Court declares law unconstitutional (decalrationuncon) 
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 Variable indicates that the Court either declared unconstitutional an act of 
Congress; a state or territorial statue, regulation, or constitutional 
provision; or a municipal or other local ordinance. 
i. Values: 
1. No declaration of unconstitutionality = 1 
2. Act of Congress declared unconstitutional = 2 
3. State or territorial law, regulation, or constitutional 
provision unconstitutional = 3 
4. Municipal or other local ordinance unconstitutional = 4 
8. Majority Vote in Supreme Court Conference (majVotes) 
 Variable specifies the number of justices voting the majority; whereas 
minVotes below indicates the opposite. 
9. Name of the Supreme Court Case (casename) 
 Variable that depicts the name of the U.S. Supreme Court case in question.  
10.  Date of Decision (dateDecision) 
 This variable contains the year, month, and day that the Court announced 
its decision on the case. 
11.  New York Times Case Salience Measure (nytsalience) 
 This variable describes U.S. Supreme Court cases that have been deemed 
salient by the NY Times Case Salience Criteria adopted by Epstein and 
Segal (2000). 
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 All U.S. Supreme Court cases that have appeared on the front page of the 
New York Times immediately after the decision was rendered have been 
deemed highly salient issues for voters and are included in this dataset. 
i. Values: 
1. High Salient Case = 1 
2. Low Salient Case = 0 
a. ***all low salient cases have been dropped from the 
dataset to make it easier to navigate. 
12. Date of the presidential approval rating poll used to establish a pretest 
(date_preapproval) 
 This variable identifies the range of dates the presidential approval rating 
data utilized to assess the public mood toward the president in office.  Due 
to data limitations, I was forced to employ multiple polling houses to find 
enough information to perform a pretest. This variable is there simply to 
identify with the polling house used. 
13. Date of the presidential approval rating poll used to establish a posttest 
(data_postapproval) 
 This variable identifies the range of dates the presidential approval rating 
data utilized to assess the public mood toward the president in office. Due 
to data limitations, I was forced to employ multiple polling houses to find 
enough information to a post- test. This variable is there simply to identify 
with the polling house used. 
14.  Pre-Test Presidential Approval Rating (preapproval) 
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 This variable identifies the number associated with the public’s approval 
of the current president’s job performance. Information is used to establish 
public mood before the U.S. Supreme Court Case occurs. 
15. Post-Test Presidential Approval Rating (postapproval) 
 This variable identifies the number associated with the public’s approval 
of the current president’s job performance. Information is used to establish 
public mood after the U.S. Supreme Court Case occurs. 
16. President Assessed in Presidential Approval Rating Pre-Test 
(preapproval_pres) 
 Variable depicts the president in office that is being assessed by the pre-
test polling house. 
17. President Assessed in Presidential Approval Rating Post-Test 
(postapproval_pres) 
 Variable depicts the president in office that is being assessed by the post-
test polling house. 
18. U.S. Supreme Court Decision Support of Democratic Presidential Candidate 
(decision_support_dem_elections) 
 This variable interprets the direction of the U.S. Supreme Court case 
decision and compares it to the expected ideology of the Democratic 
Presidential candidate on a liberal-conservative scale. Similar to the 
Presidential approval support variable; if the USSC case decision direction 
matches with the expected ideology of the candidate, the case receives a 1 
and vice versa. 
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i. Values: 
1. Decision supports candidate = 1 
2. Decision opposes candidate = 0 
19. U.S. Supreme Court Decision Support of Republican Presidential Candidate 
(decision_support_repub_elections) 
 This variable interprets the direction of the U.S. Supreme Court case 
decision and compares it to the expected ideology of the Republican 
Presidential candidate on a liberal-conservative scale. Similar to the 
Presidential approval support variable; if the USSC case decision direction 
matches with the expected ideology of the candidate, the case receives a 1 
and vice versa. 
i. Values: 
1. Decision supports candidate = 1 
2. Decision opposes candidate = 0 
20.  Donations gained by Democratic Presidential Candidate prior to the U.S. 
Supreme Court case(dem_preettest_money_raised) 
 This variable uses day to day tracking data employed by OpenSecrets.org 
(2013) to determine the amount of campaign contributions the candidate 
received by the democratic candidate the day before the U.S. Supreme 
Court decision was rendered.   
21.  Donations gained by Democratic Presidential Candidate the day of the U.S. 
Supreme Court case (dem_posttest_money_raised) 
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 This variable uses day to day tracking data employed by OpenSecrets.org 
(2013) to determine the amount of campaign contributions the candidate 
received by the democratic candidate the day of  the U.S. Supreme Court 
decision was rendered.   
22.  Donations gained by Republican Presidential Candidate prior to the U.S. 
Supreme Court case (rep_pretest_money_raised) 
 This variable uses day to day tracking data employed by OpenSecrets.org 
(2013) to determine the amount of campaign contributions the candidate 
received by the republican candidate the day before the U.S. Supreme 
Court decision was rendered.   
23.  Donations gained by Republican Presidential Candidate the day of the U.S. 
Supreme Court case (rep_posttest_money_raised) 
 This variable uses day to day tracking data employed by OpenSecrets.org 
(2013) to determine the amount of campaign contributions the candidate 
received by the republican candidate the day after the U.S. Supreme Court 
decision was rendered.   
24.  Public Opinion Election Pre-Test for Democratic Candidate 
(pre_electiondem) 
 This variable collects public opinion data from various polling houses to 
determine public mood toward the democratic presidential candidate prior 
to the U.S. Supreme Court case.  
i. We make the pre-test as close to the decision date as possible to 
control for other explanations for fluctuations in public mood.  
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25.  Public Opinion Election Pre-Test for Republican Candidate (pre_electionrep) 
 This variable collects public opinion data from various polling houses to 
determine public mood toward the republican presidential candidate prior 
to the U.S. Supreme Court case.  
i. We make the pre-test as close to the decision date as possible to 
control for other explanations for fluctuations in public mood.  
26.  Public Opinion Election Post-Test for Democratic Candidate 
(post_electiondem) 
 This variable collects public opinion data from various polling houses to 
determine public mood toward the democratic presidential candidate after 
to the U.S. Supreme Court decision has been decided.  
i. We make the post-test as close to the decision date as possible to 
control for other explanations for fluctuations in public mood.  
27.  Public Opinion Election Post-Test for Republican Candidate 
(post_electionrep) 
 This variable collects public opinion data from various polling houses to 
determine public mood toward the republican presidential candidate after 
to the U.S. Supreme Court decision has been decided.  
i. We make the post-test as close to the decision date as possible to 
control for other explanations for fluctuations in public mood.  
28.  The degree of change from pre to posttest for public opinion of the 
democratic candidate(election_rateofchange_dem) 
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 This variable assesses the degree of change from the pre-test public 
opinion poll to the posttest public opinion poll of the democratic 
candidate. This variable was created in Stata where post_electiondem was 
subtracted from pre_electiondem. 
29.  The degree of change from pre to posttest for public opinion of the 
republican candidate (election_rateofchange_repub) 
 This variable assesses the degree of change from the pre-test public 
opinion poll to the posttest public opinion poll of the republican candidate. 
This variable was created in Stata where post_electionrep was subtracted 
from pre_electionrep. 
30.  The degree of change from pre to posttest in presidential approval ratings 
for the current president in office (presapproval_rateofchange) 
 This variable assesses the degree of change from the pre-test presidential 
approval ratings to the posttest presidential approval ratings of the 
president currently in office at the time of the U.S. Supreme Court case. 
This variable was created in Stata where postapproval was subtracted from 
preapproval to create the degree of change. 
31.  The rate of change from pre to posttest in campaign donations for the 
democratic candidate(donation_rateofchange_dem) 
 This variable assesses the rate of change from the pre-test campaign 
donations for the democratic candidate to the post-test campaign 
donations. This variable was created in Stata where 
dem_posttest_money_raised was subtracted from 
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dem_prettest_money_raised divided by dem_prettest_money_raised. This 
allowed us to see the percentage of change in campaign donations from 
pre to post test.  
32.  The rate of change from pre to posttest in campaign donations for the 
republican candidate(donation_rateofchange_rep) 
 This variable assesses the rate of change from the pre-test campaign 
donations for the republican candidate to the post-test campaign donations. 
This variable was created in Stata where rep_posttest_money_raised was 
subtracted from rep_prettest_money_raised divided by 
rep_prettest_money_raised. This allowed us to see the percentage of 
change in campaign donations from pre to post test.  
33. Interaction between the degree of change in presidential approval and civil 
liberty cases (decisionsupportapprovalXcivilb) 
 This creates an interaction variable between the degree of change in 
presidential approval and civil liberty cases.  
34. Media Perception of Presidential Race (media perception_horserace_monthl) 
 This variable assesses how the media portrays the current presidential race 
to the American public. Based off the public opinion polls used in the 
data, I determine add up the number of points a presidential candidate is 
receiving per month and the number of polls they are leading to determine 
the general perception displayed to the public. 
i. 1= liberal candidate leading 
ii. 2= conservative candidate leading 
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iii. 3= no clear leader 
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